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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to give definition to aesthetic 
experience as an epistemological concept. The need for the study was based 
on the lack of continuity and focus of definition and description for aesthetic 
experience which has been highly diverse in the literature of aesthetics which 
began foremost with Baumgarten in 1 750 .  The scope of the study focuses on: 
four intelligences defined as an intelligence faculty of (1 ) general intelligence, 
(2) imaginative-intelligence, (3) creative-intelligence, and (4) poetic-intelligence; 
two perceptual ordering capacities defined as ( 1 ) an innate aesthetic sense, and 
(2) an acquired aesthetic sense; and two primordial activities defined in their 
most elemental states as ( 1 ) primordial art activity, and (2) primordial science 
activity. The hypothesis of the thesis is aesthetic experience is held to be 
epistemological experience in its most elegant and complete state and comes 
about as the result of creative and poetic intelligence. Examples given of 
individuals who have brought about experiences which are aesthetic are Poincare, 
Mendel, Darwin, Thoreau, and Michelangelo. The result of the study is that the 
definition and description of the hypothesis can be viewed as an inclusive 
definition and description for all epistemological experiences held as aesthetic. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The randomness of Nature, her powers of creativity, and man's overt 
demonstration of his creative powers born of the creative seeds of Nature's 
indeterministic ways, gives vague definition to the mysterious powers of 
creation-and, this allows for widespread speculation as to what creativity is. 
It is from Nature's evolving and ever-changing symmetry-breaking and making 
that form acquires definition. Man has become, as Darwin and Thoreau hailed 
him to be, "a part of the world he seeks to explore" (Barnett, 1 97 9:1 1 8). 
Needless to say, as Jeremy Rifkin states, "The Newtonian paradigm of 
precise measurement, of dividing matter into neat quantities without regard 
to either their effect on the rest of the cosmos or the effect of the rest of 
the cosmos on them, has led to the wanton manipulation and destruction of 
nature at the hands of modern science" (1 98 1 : 2 2 3). Knowing full well what 
this means, I am most sensitive to the need to attempt to clarify by definition 
primary processes of perceptual ongoings which when fully operant can give 
man wisdom as to the use of his newly acquired powers which can interfere with 
the natural workings of Nature and lead to irreversible environmental damage. 
Since there is no consensus agreement as to such definitions, I have given 
challenge to the mystery and vagueness which surrounds most explanations of 
such perceptual ongoings. Especially, to be dealt with in this thesis are the 
ongoings of imaginative, creative, and poetic intelligence. 
However divided these ongoings may appear in the following discourse, 
they are to be viewed as interdependent and of general experience. I have 
taken the liberty to organize primordial perceptual processes into those of an 
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innate aesthetic � and an acquired aesthetic �· Furthermore, I have 
differentiated the activities of art and science in their most elemental states 
-------
as primordial perceptual making and inquiry. 
All experience is categorized as general with characteristics which give 
some general experience specific purpose or aim.  Perception is defined as all 
faculties and operations which bring about perceptual consummation, under-
standing, and discovery. Consciousness is defined as perceptual awareness and 
requires no further definition. The most complete form of perceptual awareness 
or consciousness is to be found in aesthetic experience. What has been in the 
past ref erred to as aesthetic experience will here be referred to as sensual-emotive 
experience. Sensual-emotive experience is most often characterized by socio-
cultural and psychological factors. Thus, aesthetic experience, the outcome of 
imaginative, creative, and poetic intelligence, is the most complete form of 
consciousness and is held as rare. However, it is in this rarity of experience 
that general experience is epistemologically ordered and made elegant: the 
aesthetic experience is an experience of knowledge in its most elegant and 
complete state. 
Creative and poetic intelligence from which aesthetic experience springs 
cannot be determined by IQ tests based on Gaussian probability. The occurrence 
of creative and poetic intelligence depends on genetic randomness; and, if it 
occurs, it is a genetic risk. Its occurrence and development, if successful, will be 
evaluated in aesthetic experience. Creative-intelligence is dependent upon the 
workings of i maginative-intelligence. It brings about elegant orders which are 
epistemologically structured and which result in aesthetic experience. 
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Poetic-intelligence concerns itself with the wisdom of form .  Wisdom of 
form is a sophistication and refinement of epistemological conceptualizations. 
Thoreau tells us that wisdom is rhymed or musically measured: 
There is no doubt that the loftiest written wisdom is either 
rhymed, or in some way musically measured,-is, in form as 
well as substance, poetry; and a volume which should contain 
the condensed wisdom of mankind, need not have one rhythm­
less line (1 966 :1 08). 
Poetic-intelligence is the most refined and sophisticated state of perceptual 
awareness wherein order is viewed as elegant and complete. 
However, creative-intelligence, dependent upon imaginative-intelligence, 
breaks the parameter of past poetic impression to establish new insight into new 
epistemological ground. This is a most difficult and complex task, but one which 
is necessary for creative-intelligence to lead to discovery. 
Poetic-intelligence is both an innate and acquired capacity needed to bring 
about recognition of those elements and characteristics which define the wisdom 
of form.  
The purpose of this study is to give description to the following hypothesis: 
The human organism experiences the complexity of systems as elegant and 
epistemologically ordered as specific and aesthetic.  Although rare, aesthetic 
experience is to be considered as a characteristic of general experience. General 
experience is defined as follows: Experience is defined whenever an organism is 
on an experiential time-space continuum which is constantly in a state of 
oscillation between equilibrium and disequilibrium.  Its existence is only justified 
at a specific point in time and space. In other words: every point in time and 
space, occupied by an organism, is to be considered unique and having its own 
occurrence which distinguishes it from all other events but which is connected 
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with all other events in a delicate and complex web of interrelationships which 
carry their own past subjective occurrences and which give rise to their own 
' 
particular unfolding. Each carries with it, its own evolutional history; therefore, 
what is to be understood is confined or limited to specific occurrences at 
specific points in time and space which comes to understanding only by way of 
perceptual processes. 
General experience comes about as a result of perception in the form of 
(1) response to environmental activities-extrinsic involvement and, (2) response 
to brain activities-intrinsic involvement. All experience is general with 
characteristics which define its aim or purpose. General experience has three 
characteristics which are central to its issue: (1 ) aesthetic, ( 2) primordial 
artistic, and (3) primordial scientific. 
Aesthetic experience is perceptual experience in its most complete and 
elegant form.  Epistemology identifies aesthetic experience as experience which 
has refinement in terms of the structure of its knowledge which is elegant. Such 
order is described as a system .  Four functions must be operant before aesthetic 
experience reaches consummation: (1 ) general intelligence, (2) i maginative-intelli-
gence, (3) creative-intelligence, and (4) poetic-intelligence. 
General intelligence is that which is, for the most part, determined by 
IQ tests such as the Stanford-Binet and is correlated with academic achievement 
required by institutions of public education. IQ tests do not measure general 
creativity. However, some tests have been developed (Guildford, Torrance) 
which attempt to measure general creativity missed by IQ tests. Such tests have 
not met with the same success as IQ tests. Their lack of success has been 
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attributed to the need for a working definition of general creativity. 
General creativity, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as a 
characteristic of imaginative-intelligence experience and characterizes 
individual response or uniqueness of a perceptual expression. Imaginative-intelli­
gence is a means by which an organism experiences the bringing about of 
concrete form to abstract thought by exerting its power to go beyond such 
concretes in contemplation (be it of fantasy, daydreaming, dreaming, or 
mathematics, etc.) to determine numerous possible orderings for concretes 
about which the organism is most immediately concerned. Imaginative-intelli­
gence is to be differentiated from general creativity. General creativity 
primarily results from sensual-emotive response as well as sociocultural and 
psychological response. And, it reflects individuality or unique expression of an 
individual. Imaginative-intelligence is a desired effort to order perceptual data 
with continuity. 
In its most sophisticated state, imaginative-intelligence is a metaphoric 
operation wherein connections amongst data are made by processes which 
differentiate significant interrelationships. Metaphorical differentiation is a 
kind of general poetic-condensation of complex thought or theory which results 
in allegorical description be it of art or science. Two examples of such 
poetic-condensation into metaphor and allegory are Thoreau's ( 1 854) Walden and 
Darwin's (1 85 9) allegory of "The Great Tree." Significance is merely a descriptive 
term for meaning. Meaning carries with it a kind of response termed affinity. 
Affinity is to be held as a sensual-emotive component of significance as the 
feelings-side of i maginative-intelligence. Affinity can be associated with the 
-6-
Greek concept of �-but not "eros gone mad." Affinity does carry with it 
passion-or intense feelings for a particular. 
Imaginative-intelligence is a very powerful lower-order ordering operation. 
However, much greater in force is creative-intelligence. Creative-intelligence 
differentiates the most elegant forms from that which has been brought forth by 
imaginative-intelligence operations. Creative-intelligence is a rare occurrence 
and primarily operates to give form to poetic wisdom. Poetic wisdom is 
characteristic of forms of art and science. Creative-intelligence can be viewed 
as a higher-order ordering operation of i maginative-intelligence, but one which 
occurs as the result of genetic randomness not to be found in Gaussian distri­
butions. However, four distinct stages noted by Wallas (1 926) clearly characterize 
the gut workings of creative-intelligence: preparation, incubation, illumination, 
and verification. These stages are necessary creative-intelligence operations 
which determine missing links in specific mental puzzles for which an organism 
desires completion. Such perceptual workings require conscious preparation and 
are highly dependent upon unconscious operations. These perceptual workings 
bring about elegance, but elegance always subject to verification. 
Beyond the workings of creative-intelligence is an even greater perceptual 
rarity: the operation of poetic-intelligence. Poetic-intelligence is an acute 
sensitivity to the rightness or wrongness of form .  It concerns itself with the 
wisdom of form-wisdom, meaning the sophistication and refinement of epistemo­
logical and elegant orderings of a complex knowledge system. Two capacities 
are important to the workings of poetic-intelligence: (1) the innate capacity of 
the aesthetic sense, and (2) the acquired capacity of the aesthetic sense. Both 
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capacities bring about two primary activities: (1 ) primordial art activity, and 
(2) primordial science activity. The making of form and the investigation of 
form are govemed at the most elemental levels by these two capacities. 
Art in its most elemental state is defined as a pri mordial tendency to 
activity which sym metrically orders sensual-emotive data in response. Science 
in its most elemental state is defined as a primordial tendency to activity to 
investigate or inquire about the nature of things about which the organism is 
most curious. Art activity brings about symmetry to perceptual ongoings 
surrounding that which is meriting the organism's desire to investigate. Art is 
the means to perceptual continuity; science is the means to investigate that 
continuity. If art takes tangible form,  it is referred to as a work of art. 
If science takes tangible form, it is referred to as theory or knowledge. Art 
activity is purely human response; science activity is inquiry and investigation. 
In this respect, art activity at its most elemental and primordial level is 
precursory to science activity. It is the perceptual guts of science. 
It is of the utmost importance to understand the workings of the innate 
aesthetic sense, the acquired aesthetic sense, and the outcomes of both as 
primordial art and science activity. General intelligence is merely the exercise 
of memory and recall in response to the synthesis of socioculturally determined 
knowledge systems from the past which define the historical composites of both 
art and science. These perceptual processes are interdependent operations which 
bring about perceptual orderings. The innate aesthetic sense merely brings about 
concrete order to abstract qualities of a perceptual nature. The acquired 
aesthetic sense is an acquired sense which holds in memory (1 ) learned response 
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derived from sociocultural standards as well as (2) unique sensual-emotive and 
psychological experiential learnings. 
All perceptual tendencies, capacities, processes, and operations bring 
about experience, both general and aesthetic, and constitute the guts of the 
intelligence faculty. All occur on individual space-time continuums which are 
pushed and pulled by intrinsic and extrinsic forces and variables. These space-
, 
time continuums describe the happenings of all things, and are interrelated in 
space and time. Space-time continuums give an over-all description to all 
which is or ever was. 
However, it must be realized that almost all descriptions are lost 
immediately to history. Eiseley tells us how fleeting is experience: 
Directly stated, the evolution of the entire universe-stars, 
elements, life, man-is a process of drawing something out of 
nothing, out of the utter void of non-being. The creative 
element in the mind of man-the latency which can conceive 
gods, carve statues, move the heart with the symbols of 
great poetry, or devise the formulas of modern physics-emerges 
in as mysterious a fashion as those elementary particles which 
leap into momentary existence in great cyclotrons, only to 
vanish again like infinitesimal ghosts. The reality we know in 
our limited lifetimes is dwarfed by the unseen potential of the 
abyss where science stops. In a similar way the smaller universe 
of the individual human brain has its lonely cometary passage or 
flares suddenly like a supernova, only to subside in death while 
the waves of energy it has released roll on through unnumbered 
generations (1971:214-215). 
Eiseley tracked modern science and found the dream of Bacon: the desire that 
man's quest for solutions to problems be institutionalized-that unanswered 
problems not wait for genius-that scientific method itself would discover 
Nature (1970:53-94). Although some good has come from Bacon's dream, there 
has come also an arrogant belief of man as measure wherein man designed a 
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sword bent mighty for the wanton destruction of Nature: Eiseley tell us, "with 
understanding arise instruments of power, which always spread faster than the 
inventions of calm understanding." It is now man who must track himself and 
create a new dream beyond the dream of Bacon: Thoreau reminds us, "we, too, 
are the product of sea-slime." But we too are in a larger sense, intelligent: 
The hidden significance of these fables which is sometimes 
thought to have been detected, the ethics running parallel to 
the poetry and history, are not so remarkable as the readiness 
with which they may be made to express a variety of truths. 
As if they were the skeletons of still older and more universal 
truths than any whose flesh and blood they are for the time 
made to wear. It  is  like striving to make the sun, or  wind, or 
the sea, symbols to signify exclusively the particular thoughts 
of our day. But what signifies it? In the mythus a superhuman 
intelligence uses the unconscious thoughts and dreams of men 
as its hieroglyphics to address men unborn. In the history of 
the human mind, these glowing and ruddy fables precede the 
noon-day thoughts of men, as Aurora the sun's rays. The 
matutine intellect of the poet, keeping in advance of the 
glare of philosophy, always dwells in this auroral atmosphere 
(Thoreau, 1966:69). 
Man has the powers of a general intelligence which afford him the means by which 
to acquire the poetry within history. If Bacon's dream was for common men to 
seek answers by scientific method-then man must do so by keeping a fresh, 
poetic wisdom .  To do otherwise, is to make sacred content without meaning. 
Content without meaning is that mighty sword which has a "double edge." 
Chapter II 
CREATIVITY, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND 
EXPERIENCE: AN OVERVIEW 
The concept of aesthetics began with Greek scholars-imagination 
was of interest to Coleridge, Poe and Blake-creativity was contemplated by 
Freud, Jung and Maslow-general intelligence consumed the attention of Binet, 
Wechsler and Guildford-and, the creative process was a consideration of 
Poincare, Wallas and Ghiselin. The moral of the story is that there exist 
thousands of differing opinions, hypotheses, and theories for aesthetics, 
imagination, general intelligence, and creativity. Sorting through all the 
credible data written on any one of the preceding concepts occupies the lives 
of hundreds of scholars at any given time period. A second moral to the story 
is: to date, there is no universal agreement as to definitions for the four concepts. 
However, there is general agreement that all four concepts are related and 
necessary for the bringing about of new knowledge and new understanding. 
The question, which formally began with Plato, is how? Plato tells us of 
"beautiful forms" in The Symposium: 
For he who would proceed rightly in this matter should 
begin in youth to turn to beautiful forms; and first, if 
his instructor guide him rightly, he should learn to love 
one such form only-out of that he should create fair 
thoughts; and soon he would himself perceive that the 
beauty of one form is truly related to the beauty of 
another; and then if beauty in general is his pursuit, 
how foolish would he be not to recognize that the 
beauty in every form is one and the same (1973:353). 
Plato tells us that teacher and student must proceed "rightly" if one is "to 
recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same" (1973:353). Teacher, 
student, and "proceeding rightly," according to Plato, are somehow necessary 
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"until at length he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed 
to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere" ( 1 97 3 :  
353-354). And who might such a man be, who can as Plato desires, have the 
vision at last revealed of "the science of beauty everywhere?"  Perhaps, such 
a man was Thoreau-but, of a teacher, we know not one. Thoreau tells us 
metaphorically in Walden: 
These foliaceous heaps lie along the bank like the slag of 
a furnace, showing that Nature is "in full blast" within. 
The earth is not a mere fragment of dead history, stratum 
upon stratum like the leaves of a book, to be studied by 
geologists and antiquaries chiefly, but living poetry like the 
leaves of a tree, which precede flowers and fruit,-not a 
fossil earth, but a living earth; compared with whose great 
central life all animal and vegetable life is merely parasitic. 
Its throes will heave our exuviae from their graves.  You may 
melt your metals and cast them into the most beautiful 
molds you can; they will never excite me like the forms 
which this molten earth flows out into. And not only it, 
but the institutions upon it, are plastic like clay in the 
hands of the potter (1 966 :204). 
In Thoreau's Journal on July 5 ,  1 85 2 ,  he wrote: "Here is a bird in whose strain the 
story is told, though Nature waited for the science of aesthetics to discover it to 
man." In 1 859 ,  Darwin published The Origin of Species. And it is in The Origin of 
Species that Darwin tell us: 
I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, 
if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, 
in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. 
We have seen that man by selection can certainly produce 
great results, and can adapt organic beings to his own uses, 
through the accumulation of slight but useful variations, 
given to him by the hand of Nature. But Natural Selection, 
as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for 
action, and is as immeasurably superior to man's feeble 
efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art ( 1 97 5 :1 1 5). 
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To which teacher does Darwin give credit for leading him rightly to Nature's 
beauty? To no one certain man-Darwin maintains that not even Erasmus Darwin 
had much effect on him (Eiseley, 1 9 6 1 :144). And to Plato's "beautiful forms," of 
which one form is in and of the same beauty with all others, Thoreau and Darwin 
both give new definition: 
With the rise of natural selection and the philosophy of 
actual physical descent with modification, man becomes, 
along with all the other forms of life, "the child of 
chance" (1 96 1  :334). 
The war of nature of which Darwin feared, but with which Thoreau felt affinity, 
brought down Plato's house of absolute "symmetry and design": 
All notion of preconceived Platonic ideal forms has 
vanished from this system. The fixed taxonomy of 
life is an illusion born of our limited experience. In 
reality every living thing is writhing from one shape 
into another in the way that we might witness the 
growth of a tropical forest in a speeded-up motion 
picture. Our long assumed stability is only the 
illusion produced by the tempo at which we live. 
(1 96 1 :334-33 5). 
Nature is viewed as infinitely creative. 
In 1 91 6 ,  Sigmund Freud (1 856-1 939) published the General Introduction to 
· Psychoanalysis which contained the evolving theory of the libido and the 
unconscious, with the unconscious, soon after, to be widely accepted as the 
source of creativity. 
Freud thought of creativity as the sublimation of the sexual urge. He saw 
the unconscious as a kind of "Pandora's Box" wherein exists irrational unconscious 
phenonmena and "things that go bump in the night." Freud instilled in most 
academic circles an intense fear of the "unleasing of the contents of the 
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unconscious." Thereafter, the unconscious and creativity were explored by most 
as the product of sickness, until Maslow (1 908-1 970) decided "that the concept 
of creativeness and the concept of the healthy, self-actualizing, fully human 
person seem to be coming closer and closer together, and may perhaps turn out 
to be the same thing" ( 1 980 :55). 
Thoreau and Darwin had not much use for man. Nature was viewed as 
supremely beautiful and powerfully creative. Freud, however, was most 
concerned with man, but viewed him as having a kind of inner war between 
unconscious and conscious forces within. He viewed man as having to control 
unconscious urges which included the urge to create. It was commonly viewed 
that the release of creative forces from the unconscious were accompanied by 
a kind of "frenzied madness." Rollo May (1 980) in The Courage to Create states, 
"We must indeed take a strong stand against the implications, however they may 
creep in, that talent is a disease and creativity is a neurosis" (1 980:37 ). May 
continues, in support of Maslow's conclusions: "The creative process must be 
explored not as the product of sickness, but as representing the highest degree 
of emotional health, as the expression of the normal people in the act of 
actualizing themselves" (1 980 :38). However, the Freudian link between creativity 
and sickness continues to be sought-Jon Karlsson (1 978) in Inheritance of Creative 
Intelligence, makes quite a case for the relation of creativity to the schizophrenia 
gene (1 978 :1 31-141 ). Karlsson introduces the possibility of such a relation by 
saying: "If psychotic symptoms can be assumed to be caused by a chemical 
aberration, occurring in individuals born with a specific schizophrenic constitution, 
it becomes easy to visualize a relationship between psychosis and creativity" 
(1 978 : 131 ). 
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The randomness of Nature, her powers of creativity, and man's overt 
demonstration of creative powers born of the creative seeds of Nature's 
indeterministic ways, gives vague definition to the mysterious power of 
creation-and, this allows for widespread speculation. If man desires to know, 
he must take on the role of the waiting spectator of evolutionary processes: 
Depending upon his limited perceptual powers, he must attempt to decipher 
new order as it unfolds. And when he is curious about nature, he becomes a 
seeker of messages-"each man deciphers from the ancient alphabets of nature 
only those secrets that his own deeps possess the power to endow with meaning. 
It had been so with Darwin and Thoreau" (Eiseley, 1 969 : 146). It is from Nature's 
evolving and ever-changing symmetry-breaking and making, that form acquires 
definition. For the most part, man must wait for that evolution. And so it 
was with Darwin and his synthesis of The Origin of Species that Newton's 
"machine-like universe," most despised by Thoreau, began to topple. For the 
first time in the history of man, scientists were forced to examine the wedge 
driven between the "subjective and objective" nature of man-a wedge which 
had received its first blow from Plato and its last blow from Newton. Western 
man was forced to examine his scientific and philosophic base. I believe one of 
the most interesting and extensive attempts to bring about a synthesis of 
"subjectivity and objectivity" was made by F.S.C. Northrop in the writing of 
The Meeting of East and West, published in 1 946.  However, I believe that 
Lincoln Barnett gives a much more comprehensible view of the eroding separation 
of the age old division between "subjectivity and objectivity" in The Universe and 
Dr. Einstein, first published in 1 948 .  Barnett states: 
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Out of Galileo's discoveries and those of Newton in 
the next generation there evolved a mechanical universe 
of forces, pressures, tensions, oscillations, and waves. 
There seemed to be no process of nature which could not 
be described in terms of ordinary experience, illustrated 
by a concrete model or predicted by Newton's amazingly 
accurate laws of mechanics. But before the turn of the 
past century certain deviations from these laws became 
apparent; and though these deviations were slight, they 
were of such a fundamental nature that the whole edifice 
of Newton's machine-like universe began to topple. The 
certainty that science can explain how things happen 
began to dim about twenty years ago. And right now it 
is a question whether scientific man is in touch with 
"reality" at all-or can ever hope to be (1 979 :1 5-1 6). 
Barnett continues: "To understand the significance of this retreat it is 
necessary to step across the thin line that divides physics from metaphysics. 
Questions involving the relationship between observer and object, have haunted 
philosophical thinkers since the dawn of reason" (1 97 9 : 1 8). He continues, 
Thus gradually philosophers and scientists arrived at 
the startling conclusion that since every object is simply 
the sum of its qualities, and since qualities exist only in 
the mind, the whole objective universe of matter and 
energy, atoms and stars, does not exist except as a 
construction of the consciousness, an edifice of conven­
tional symbols shaped by the senses of man (1 979: 1 9). 
Barnett's theme is that of "realization that our whole knowledge of the universe 
is simply a residue of impressions clouded by our imperfect senses which makes 
the quest for reality seem hopeless" (1 979 :21 ). 
But, according to Barnett, there seems to be continuity to perceptions. 
He states, 
If nothing has existence save in its being perceived, the 
world should dissolve into anarchy of individual perceptions. 
But a curious order runs through our perceptions, as if 
indeed there might be an underlayer of objective reality 
which our senses translate. Although no man can ever 
know whether his sensation of red or of Middle C is the 
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same as another man's, it is nevertheless possible 
to act on the assumption that everyone sees 
colors and hears tones more or less alike (1 979:  
21-22). 
Barnett continues to explain why it is of such importance to scientists to begin 
to trust perception. He says, "the paradox of physics today is that with every 
improvement in its mathematical apparatus the gulf between man the observer 
and the objective world of scientific description becomes more profound" (1 979 :22). 
How does man deal with uncertainity? This randomness of Nature ? With Darwin's 
forms writhing from one shape into another? Barnett tells us: 
For by dealing, in terms of statistics and probabilities 
it abandons all idea that nature exhibits an inexorable 
sequence of cause and effect between individual 
happenings. And by its admission of margins of 
uncertainty it yields up the ancient hope that science, 
given the present state and velocity of every material 
body in the universe, can forecast the history of the 
universe for all time. One by-product of this surrender 
is a new argument for the existence of free will. For 
if physical events are indeterminate and the future is 
unpredictable, then perhaps the unknown quantity called 
"mind" may yet guide man's destiny among the infinite 
uncertainties of a capricious universe (1 979 :34-3 5). 
And, so it happens-the "mind" of man becomes the key to understanding 
where the methods of science seem to fail. However, there appears, according 
to Barnett, to be a limit to the mind of man. Barnett tells us: 
Another conclusion of greater scientific importance is 
that in the evolution of quantum physics the barrier 
between man, peering dimly through the clouded 
windows of his senses, and whatever objective reality 
may exist has been rendered almost impassable. For 
whenever he attempts to penetrate and spy on the 
"real" objective world, he changes and distorts its 
workings by the very process of his observation. And 
when he tries to divorce this "real" world from his 
sense perceptions he is left with nothing but a 
mathematical scheme. He is indeed somewhat in 
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the position of a blind man trying to discern the 
shape and texture of a snowflake. As soon as it 
touches his fingers or his tongue it dissolves (1 97 9 :  
35). 
Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu: 
In trying to distinguish appearance from reality 
and lay bare the fundamental structure of the 
universe, science has had to transcend the "rabble 
of the senses." But its highest edifices, Einstein 
has pointed out, have been "purchased at the 
price of emptiness of content." A theoretical 
concept is emptied of content to the very degree 
that it is divorced from sensory experience. For 
the only world man can truly know is the world 
created for him by his senses. If he expunges all 
the impressions which they translate and memory 
stores, nothing is left (1 979 :1 1 3-1 1 4). 
Science has been pushed to accept sensory perception and experience as a part 
of scientific method: 
For all the promise of future revelations it 
is possible that certain terminal boundaries have 
already been reached in man's struggle to under­
stand the manifold of nature in which he finds 
himself. In his descent into the microcosm he has 
encountered indeterminacy, duality, paradox­
barriers that seem to admonish him he cannot 
pry too inquisitively into the heart of things 
without altering and vitiating the processes he 
seeks to observe (1 979:1 1 5). 
Man has become, as Darwin hailed him to be, "a part of the world he seeks to 
explore" (1 979:1 1 8). Eiseley tells us: "For many years philosophers had debated 
the nature of man's relationship to the natural world about him.  In the year 1 859 
science discovered man was an animal . . .  " ( 1 96 1 :2 5 5). Barnett puts man midway 
between macrocosm and microcosm: 
Man's inescapable impasse is  that he himself is 
part of the world he seeks to explore; his body and 
proud brain are mosaics of the same elemental 
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particles that compose the dark, drifting clouds of 
intersellar space; he is, in the final analysis, merely 
an ephemeral conformation of the primordial space­
time field. Standing midway between macrocosm and 
microcosm he finds barriers on every side and can 
perhaps but marvel, as St. Paul did nineteen hundred 
years ago, that "the world was created by the word of 
God so that what is seen was made out of things which 
do not appear (1 97 9:1 1 7-1 1 8). 
Science, at least, according to Barnett, was fully aware of the need to 
pull out the wedge between subjectivity and objectivity-between physics and 
metaphysics. A more recent and popular book that continues the saga begun 
by Barnett in 1 948,  is Jeremy Rifkin's Entropy: A New World View (1 981 ). Spear-
headed by 1 977 Nobel Laureate Illya Prigogine's work in chemical dissipative 
structures, Rifkin sets forth a pressing argument which he believes would be the 
final force necessary to remove the wedge-that force, according to Rifkin, is 
entropy, the second law of thermodynamics. Rifkin defines entropy as a law 
which states "that matter and energy can only be changed in one direction, that 
is, from usable to unusable, or from available to unavailable , or from ordered to 
disordered" (1 9 8 1 :6). Rifkin summarizes the second law with the following: 
In essence, the second law says that everything in the universe 
began with structure and value and is irrevocably moving in 
the direction of random chaos and waste. Entropy is a measure 
of the extent to which available energy in any subsystem of the 
universe is transformed into available form. According to the 
Entropy Law, whenever a semblance of order is created anywhere 
on earth or in the universe, it is done at the expense of causing an 
even greater disorder in the surrounding environment (1 98 1 :6). 
According to Rifkin: "The Entropy Law destroys the notion of history as progress" 
(1 981  :7). And, he believes "the Entropy Law destroys the notion that science 
and technology create a more ordered world" (1 98 1 :7). Rifkin says: "Within a 
few years every academic discipline will be turned inside out by the new entropy 
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conception" ( 1 981  :7). Rifkin continues with an extended version of Barnett's 
discussion by including the ramifications of the second law of thermodynamics, 
entropy: "Up to a hundred years ago, physics rolled along self-assured by its 
own claims that any set of initial conditions can lead to one, and only one, 
final state" (1 98 1  : 222). He continues: 
Today, the causality principle of classical physics has become 
so qualified that it could hardly claim the status of law. Scien­
tists now acknowledge that a given set of initial conditions can 
lead to several possible alternative states. They distinguish 
between the early deterministic laws and the newer indeter­
ministic laws. In the latter case, probabilities are assigned to 
each of the best that can be hoped for in terms of measurement. 
But even the indeterministic laws are now being challenged by 
what some scientists refer to as "a second stage of indeterminism," 
in which the assignment of probabilities for the various outcomes 
of an event are virtually impossible to establish. The renowned 
physicist Max Born summed up the frustration of his colleagues 
over the direction in which their own research has led: "We have 
sought for firm ground and found none. The deeper we penetrate, 
the more restless becomes the universe; all is rushing about and 
vibrating in a wild dance" ( 1 981  : 2 2 2-22 3). 
Rifkin continues with an attack on the Newtonian paradigm of precise measure-
ment: 
What scientists have learned is that every event is unique; its 
own occurrence distinguishes it from all other events. For that 
reason, each event not only claims a place all its own in the 
world but cannot be said to share an objective reality with any 
other phenomenon. Its subjective occurrence, in turn, is not 
the result of a particular initial set of conditions. Rather, it 
owes its occurrence to the entire labyrinth of all past subjective 
occurrences whose collective configuration gave rise to its own 
particular unfolding. The idea that specific phenomena can be 
isolated from the rest of the universe they're a part of and when 
connected in some kind of "pure" causal relationship with other 
isolated phenomena is just wrong thinking. The Newtonian 
paradigm of precise measurement, of dividing matter into neat 
quantities that can then be linked to each other and rearranged 
without regard to either their effect on the rest of the cosmos 
or the effect of the rest of the cosmos on them, has led to the 
wanton manipulation and destruction of nature at the hands of 
modern science (1 98 1 : 2 2 3). 
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Rifkin's conclusions call for the reformulation of science and education. 
In the following excerpt, he explains why there is a need for such reformation: 
llya Prigogine, who received a Nobel Prize for his work on 
nonequilibrium thermodynamics in 1 977, says that the entire 
notion of causality and precise measurement, the hallmarks of 
classical physics, are about to give way to a redefinition of 
science based on the imperative of the second law. Every 
occurrence in the world is unique, argues Prigogine, and for 
that reason it's impossible to make precise predictions about 
the future based on scientific observations. The most that 
science can do is predict likely scenarios. The old security 
provided by classical physics was an illusion from the beginning, 
say Prigogine and his colleagues. It is not possible to know nature 
in the sense that Descartes, Bacon, and Newton had in mind. The 
idea that human beings can separate themselves from nature, 
discover its inner secrets, and then use them as a "fixed body of 
truths" to manipulate and change the natural world has proven 
erroneous. First, as scientist Niels Bohr once remarked, we are 
all actors as well as spectators in the unfolding of the natural 
order. We can't separate ourselves from the world around us no 
matter how hard we try. Secondly, the notion of fixed bodies of 
truths, in the determininistic sense of classical physics, no longer 
holds up as we now experience a universe of continual fluctuation 
and instability. Prigogine captures the essence of the new reformu­
lation of science when he says that "instead of the classical descrip­
tion of the world as an automaton we go back more to the Greek 
paradigm of the world as a work of art" (1 981 :224). 
Rifkin's heavy reliance on the works of llya Prigogine is due to Prigogine's trans-
formation and revision of the science of irreversible thermodynamics. A concept 
which received, for the most part, secondary attention to equilibrium. According 
to Prigogine in a recent interview published in OMNI, "it is nonequilibrium that 
is essential to the understanding of our world and the universe" ( 1 983 :90). In 1 946,  
Prigogine began to formulate his conception of dissipative structures. This theory 
defines the workings of open dissipative systems. Open dissipative systems are 
systems in which matter and energy are exchanged with the outside environment. 
In contrast with open systems are closed systems, which according to Prigogine, 
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are ideal concepts (1 983:86). Irreversibility describes Prigogine's universe: "You 
cannot reverse the evolution of the universe, even theoretically. And you cannot 
predict its future, except in terms of scenarios that depend on never-ending series 
of ... crossroads in the chain of causality" ( 1 983 :86). 
Prigogine extends his theory of dissipated structures to encompass the 
biological and social scientific fields of inquiry (Schieve and Allen, 1 98 2). 
Prigogine views nonequilibrium as a source of organization and order. Based 
on his observation of a phenomenon termed the Benard Instability, Prigogine 
linked the self-organization of matter between animate and inanimate matter. 
His definition of open dissipative structures, as structures with continuous flows 
of energy which may become so complex that fluctuations occur which are too 
great for the system to absorb, thus forcing it to reorganize, with each reorgani-
zation producing greater complexity and the likelihood of random fluctuation, 
which results in even more instability, requiring more reorganization, thus 
producing new structures, ends with evolution as organized and ordered. 
The Zhabotinsky Reactions confirmed Prigogine's theory that reactions 
requiring continuous outside sources of energy occur at states far from equilibrium 
and are self-organizing. According to Prigogine, the laws near equilibrium are 
different: near equilibrium occurs the most uniform state. Far from equilibrium, 
occurs specificity-new orders. The result, according to Prigogine, is order out of 
chaos. 
Prigogine has given us the fuel to chip away at the remainder of the eroding 
Newtonian paradigm. Prigogine says of the mechanical view of nature; 
This view held that the world is made up of unchanging substances­
atoms, molecules, or elementary particles. It also held that the only 
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type of change is through locomotion such as the rotation 
of planets-that there's no qualitative change. The classical 
view gave rise to the idea of the world as automation ( 1 983 :  
88). 
What has changed, according to Prigogine, is the belief "that at some level the 
world is simple and is governed by universal time-independent laws ... this now 
appears to be an excessive idealization" ( 1 983:88). He continues, "everywhere, 
we're faced with complexity and time-in the classical view, we had already 
discovered the great laws . . .  In my view, we have yet to discover them" ( 1 983:88,90). 
According to Prigogine, the universe is defined by complexity. In order that 
complexity be understood, bifurcation must be considered. 
Bifurcation is central to Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures. 
"Bifurcation," according to Prigogine, "is the appearance of new states of matter 
at critical points. Before that critical point is reached you have a chaotic 
structure. But once that point has been reached you have order" ( 1 983:90). The 
outcome of bifurcation is specificity: complexity can spontaneously arise far 
from equilibrium. Prigogine's paradigm of self-organization gives us the capacity 
to view a transition from disorder to order. He says, 
Within the paradigm of self-organization we see a transition 
from disorder to order. In the field of psychological activity 
this is perhaps the main experience we have-every artistic or 
scientific creation implies a transition from disorder to order 
(1 983:92). 
Prigogine continues: 
Clearly in the physical universe four types of phenomena occur. 
Structures appear as with biological systems and social systems; 
and they disappear, as when you mix two liquids. There are also 
deterministic processes, like the motion of the earth around the 
sun, and nondeterministic processes. What has changed is the 
preception of the relative importance of these processes. We 
begin to see now that the deterministic processes can be seen 
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only in isolated, artificial systems. The natural world, on 
the other hand, is a world of irreversible processes of self­
organization. So I talk about a new dialogue with nature 
because I think we are beginning to perceive nature on 
Earth in exactly the opposite way we viewed it in classical 
physics. We no longer conceive of nature as a passive object. 
I can't stress enough that it is an active object in our lives. 
And we see now that life has much deeper roots than we once 
suspected (1 983 :92). 
He concludes: 
I wanted to bring together two concepts: the idea of structure 
which generally is static; and dissipative, for which you need 
energy continually brought in and going out. This is the type 
of structure that may appear at some distance from equilibrium.  
Far from equilibrium you have specificity. The world is multiple: 
We have ants, elephants, plants, and civilizations. New, highly 
specific solutions appear when you go far from equilibrium 
(1 983:92). 
Prigogine tells us: "Well, I think today we have begun to accept the idea that our 
physics is the results of our conscious activity" ( 1 983 :92). He continues: 
Consciousness plays an essential role because we construct 
reality through mathematical concepts. If our consciousness 
had a different structure we probably could not use the same 
type of constructs that we do. That is not to say physics is 
subjective: there must be a relation between our physics and 
reality. However, the way in which we speak about this 
reality is something we create ( 1 983:92). 
In response to the future of science, Prigogine replies: 
The purpose of classical physics was to find some fundamental 
level of simplicity in terms of which our universe could be 
deciphered. I doubt if this level exists. Instead we will have 
to deal with the complexity we have discovered. But this very 
complexity will lead to new disciplines, which will help us to 
transfer our knowledge from one domain to another. Perhaps 
the challenge of these coming years will be to master complexity 
(1 983 : 121 ). 
He continues: 
Chardin described the world as if he were outside of it. He was 
sure that every change, every new bifurcation, was going in the 
right direction-in the direction of increased spiritually. On the 
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contrary, I am more impressed by the existence of multiple 
time-horizons. A bifurcation can lead us to the best or to 
the worst. We are participating in an evolution whose 
outcome isn't clear to us (1 983 : 121 ). 
When I was a graduate student (1 976) at Montana State University, my 
professors were kind enough to accept an answer given during the writing of 
one of my "Written Comprehensive" questions. The answer, revised, read 
something like the following: An organism is on an experiential time-space 
continuum which is constantly in a state of oscillation between equilibrium and 
disequilibrium. Its existence is only justified at a specific point in time and 
space. In other words: every point in time and space, occupied by an organism, 
is to be considered unique and having its own occurrence which distinguishes it 
from all other events in a delicate and complex web of interrelationships which 
carry their own past subjective occurrences and which give rise to their own 
particular unfolding. Each carries with it, its own evolutional history; therefore, 
what is to be understood is confined or limited to specific occurrences at 
specific points in time and space which comes to understanding only by way of 
perceptual processes. 
A second conclusion reached in 1 976 is that creativity and aesthetic 
experience are not confined to the making or appreciation of works of art; as a 
matter of fact, aesthetic experience, except in extremely rare instances, is not 
involved in the making or appreciation of most works of art. The conclusion is 
based on the belief that if works of art are to be the result of creative processes 
and felt as aesthetic experience, they are so because they are not the outcome 
of general creativity but of creative-intelligence. General creativity is the out-
come of innate ordering capacities which result not in experiences which are 
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aesthetic, but which result in sensual-emotive response and lower-order 
imaginative-intelligence operations. I am firmly convinced that there is a 
definitional separation which exists between sensual-emotive response and 
aesthetic experience. 
A third conclusion reached in 1 976  is that education is a process of 
identifying continuums-within continuums-within continuums-which infinitely 
interrelate to create webs expressing scenarios-within scenarios-within 
scenarios-which define the history of evolution and experience. This history 
is to be viewed as highly complex. 
The last conclusion reached in 1 976 ,  is that no one set of initial conditions 
defining a dynamic system can be held indefinitely closed. Primarily I see this 
in terms of epistemological systems which define thought. Therefore, it is 
concluded, that in order to reach an understanding of a complex system, the 
organism's thought processes would have to meet the challenge of such complexity. 
The question then becomes, how does this happen? I am convinced that general 
intelligence and general creativity do not allow for such complex understandings. 
The hypothesis which I put forth in this paper is: The human organism 
experiences the complexity of systems as elegant and epistemically ordered as 
specific and aesthetic. The procedure to be used is interpretative and definitional: 
The thesis will attempt to conceptualize what aesthetic experience is. Although 
aesthetic experience is to be considered purely experiential and a characteristic 
of general experience, it needs to be differentiated from general experience for 
purposes of clarification. However, there is no such thing as modes of experience; 
this is an erroneous concept. Instead, there is just general experience and the 
characteristics of general experience. One characteristic of general experience 
-26-
is that it can be aesthetic, although this is extremely rare. However, it is in 
this rarity that general experience is espistemologically ordered and made 
elegant. For the purposes of discussion and understanding, general experience, 
of which aesthetic experience is a rare characteristic, shall be treated apart 
from aesthetic experience. 
Thoreau on October 1 0 ,  1 858 ,  made an entry in his last Journal ( 1 8 58-1 861 ). 
The entry was made near the eve of Darwin's publication of The Origin of Species. 
Thoreau wrote: 
The simplest and most lumpish fungus has a peculiar interest 
to us, compared with a mere mass of earth, because it is so 
obviously organic and related to ourselves, however mute. It is 
the expression of an idea; growth according to law; matter not 
dormant, not raw, but inspired, appropriated by spirit. If I take 
up a handful of earth, however separately interesting the 
particles may be, their relation to one another appears to be 
that of mere juxtaposition generally. I might have thrown them 
together thus. But the humblest fungus betrays a life akin to 
my own. It is a successful poem in its kind. There is suggested 
something superior to any particle of matter, in the idea or mind 
which uses and arranges the particles (1 96 1 :1 99-200). 
Thoreau on several occassions expressed the concern that his mind had become too 
microscopic-too concerned with detail, most often of science. But this very fact 
of his nature led him rightfully to penetrating insights into the very workings of 
things. On March 28,  1 859 ,  Thoreau wrote in his Journal: 
. . .  They [arrowheads ] are not fossil bones, but, as it were, 
fossil thoughts, forever reminding me of the mind that shaped 
them. I would fain know that I am treading in the tracks of 
human game-that I am on the trail of mind-and these little 
reminders never fail to set me right. When I see these signs 
I know that the subtle spirits that made them are not far 
off, into whatever form transmuted (1 96 1 : 2 0 7). 
As with all things, Thoreau's arrowheads carry history-the workings of things: 
. . .  the arrowhead shall perhaps, never cease to wing its way 
through the ages to eternity . . .  arrow points lie sleeping in 
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the skin of the revolving earth, while meteors revolve 
in space ...  The footprint, the mind-print of the oldest 
men (1 96 1 : 2 07-208). 
Although Thoreau's experiences were for the most part aesthetic, they sprang 
from the ordering of general experience; the aesthetic element or characteristic 
of general experience is its aesthetic episteme. General experience, from which 
aesthetic experience springs, is defined as follows: General experience is defined 
whenever an organism is on an experiential time-space continuum which is 
constantly in a state of oscillation between equilibrium and disequilibrium. Its 
existence is only justified at a specific point in tim e  and space. In other words: 
every point in time and space,  occupied by an organis m ,  is to be considered 
unique and having its own occurrence which distinguishes it from all other events 
but which is connected with all other events in a delicate and complex web of 
interrelationships which carry their own past subjective occurrences and which 
give rise to their own particular unfolding. Each carries with it, its own 
evolutional history; therefore, what is to be understood is confined or limited 
to specific occurrences at specific points in time and space which comes to 
understanding only by way of perceptual processes. 
Eiseley tells us: "for nature lives in anticipation. Thoreau was part of 
the future. He walked toward it, knowing also that in the case of man it must 
emerge from within by means of his own creation" (1 969 :144). Although aesthetic 
experience which springs from general experience is rare, it must be the kind 
to which we all aspire-for it brings about perceptual understandings of the 
highest order. 
Chapter III 
AESTHETICS AND C REATIVITY 
Aesthetics has its origin in Greek Philosophy, with the Greek term 
aesthetikos, m eaning perceptive. Traditionally, aesthetics has been the branch 
of philosophy which deals with beauty or the beautiful, especially in art, and with 
taste and standards of value in judging art. 
The term aesthetics was introduced by Alexander Gottieb Baumgarten 
( 1 7 1 4-1 762) to imply the science of sensuous knowledge, whose aim is beauty 
contrasted with logic , whose aim is truth. Thus, the name of aesthetics, as the 
philosophy of beauty and art, was introduced by Baumgarten for the first time 
about 1 7 50,  and for the most part, has retained Baumgarten's definition up to 
the present. 
However, in some cases, aesthetics is departing from traditional conceptions 
in philosophy by comparing examples of all the arts, and in gathering data and 
hypotheses from other disciplines including philosophy, psychology, sociobiology, 
cultural history, and the social sciences. It includes empirical study of particular 
phenomena versus restricting itself to abstract metaphysical discussion of the 
meaning of beauty. Studies stress the nature and varities of form in art, the 
psychology of creation, appreciation, imagination, and works of art. 
The full use of scientific method is still com monly regarded as impossible 
or highly restricted in application. It is commonly held that aesthetics concerns 
itself with the nature of works of art and the nature of beauty. Beginning with 
Greek philosophy and continuing up to the present, there is no one single 
universally accepted definition or philosophy for aesthetics, beauty, or art. 
This has created an immense problem in the arts: the arts lack focus and definition. 
-29-
I do not intend to use the term epistemology in its traditional philosophic 
sense. The term epistemology in this paper will be used as a descriptive term to 
identify aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience is held to be epistemological 
experience in its most elegant and complete state. However, the word epistemology 
derives its origin from the Greek, episteme meaning k!nowledge plus logos, theory. 
It is considered the branch of philosophy which conducts inquiry into the origin, 
structure, methods, and validity of knowledge. "Epistemology" appears to have 
been used for the first time by J.F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics ( 1 854), who 
differentiated two branches of philosophy: epistemology and ontology. The word 
gained status when it was adopted by E. Zeller, Ueber Aufgabe Bedetung der 
Erkenntnisstheorie ( 1 8 6  2). 
Ontology is regarded as logic: the theory of being gua being. The division 
between epistemology and logic (ontology) is clearly defined traditionally: logic 
is the formal science of principles governing valid reasoning; epistemology is 
regarded as the philosophical science of the nature of knowledge and truth. The 
division continues today in philosophy. 
Art traditionally, since Aristotle, has been viewed philosophically as a 
branch of knowledge distinguished both from theoretical science and practical 
wisdom. However, there are thousands of definitions for art which are not 
philosophically determined in the traditional sense. The most common include the 
idea of art as making aesthetically pleasing objects m eant to bring pleasure to a 
viewer. A common idea about art is that art is a unique expression of a creative 
origin. Creativity as Webster's defines it, is "a process of making, of bringing into 
being." This process is generally viewed as one of emotion or passion. Historically 
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there has been a clear and continuing differentiation between the making of 
art and the making of science. However, there has been some agreement that 
the processes involved in discovery or innovation be they of art or science are 
similar. Those processes are usually referred to as creative problem-solving steps 
(Wallas, 1 926). To date there is no one universally accepted definition of art. 
I will give definition to art in its most elemental state as the primordial 
tendency to symmetrically order-up sensual-emotive data in response to experience 
either real or imagined. This primordial tendency is closely aligned with the innate 
capacity to bring about concrete order to abstract qualities of a perceptual nature. 
General creativity traditionally as been differentiated from general 
intelligence and has come to mean the ability to produce new forms in art or 
mechanics or to solve problems by novel methods. Considerable disagreement 
exists as to specific definition for general creativity, and theories of general 
creativity are exceedingly widespread and differing. 
Wallas (1 9 26) identified four distinct stages or steps of creative problem­
solving: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. For the most 
part, Wallas' stages have been widely accepted. However, his stages are viewed 
by many as incomplete. 
There does not exist one universally accepted definition for general 
creativity; however, most definitions include something from the following 
summation: Creativity is primarily the result of unconscious activity. Creativity 
focuses on divergent thinking abilities. Creative thinking abilities include fluency, 
flexibility, originality, and elaboration. Creativity has its origin in schizophrenia 
and/or other types of psychosis/neurosis. Creativity predominantly occurs in the 
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world of art versus the world of science. Creativity is the outcome of 
imaginative operations. Creativity involves nonconformist thinking. Creativity 
is a unique human capacity which sets man from all other living things. Creativity 
is qualitative. Creativity is required for genius contribution. Creativity is 
emotive. 
There has been some research on creative imagination but not much. 
Recently there has been some interest in right-hemisphere imagery production. 
There has been widespread interest in the relationship between divergent thinking 
(Guildford 1 95 0) and general creativity. The two leaders in the field of general 
creativity measurement are J.P. Guildford and E.P. Torrance, however, including 
the tests of these two leaders, tests for general creativity are not reliable 
predictors of creative performance. This lack of success is attributed to the need 
for a working definition of general creativity. 
There does not exist an overall agreement on a definition for true intelligence; 
however, there is agreement as to a definition for general intelligence. General 
intelligence is determined by IQ scores, or academic achievement. But it is 
believed that testing for general intelligence is limited and culture bound. For the 
most part, "giftedness" is defined by IQ scores of 1 3 0  and above which define less 
than two percent of the general population. Evidence supports that creativity is 
not measured by IQ tests. The correlation is between IQ scores and academic 
performance. 
Terman's Genetic Studies of Genius is the most complete study of develop­
mental patterns of gifted intelligence as measured by IQ tests. Terman used as 
his sole criterion the Standford-Binet IQ Test. His sample included those with an 
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IQ of 1 5 0  and above. Although Terman's subjects were considered as successful, 
he did not identify one subject who made a significant contribution of eminence. 
However, IQ tests do m easure very successfully general intelligence as it 
correlates with academic performance and economic success. 
The first use of the Binet IQ Test in A merica was made by Goddard (1 908). 
Terman adapted the Binet in 1 9 1 6  at Stanford to measure general intelligence 
amongst white American schoolchildren. Terman's IQ test is the Stanford-Binet 
and although it has undergone revision, it is still used today to determine general 
intelligence in America. It is widely accepted that the Stanford-Binet is culture 
bound. It is commonly held that IQ and eminence is spurious and that an IQ 
beyond 1 20 has little relationship to general creativity. Some findings indicate 
that seventy percent of the top twenty percent of high creatives are missed on a 
measure of IQ-and having a high IQ score usually does not guarantee creativity 
as having a low IQ score means creativity is impossible. Therefore, it must be 
concluded that although measures for general intelligence are successful 
indicators of academic achievement, the m easurements for general creativity 
have not met with the same success. 
Khatena (1 98 2) summarizes the basic state of affairs for general intelligence 
and general creativity in the following excerpt: 
Intelligence measures do not set out to appraise a person's 
ability to be creative, imaginative, inventive, and original. 
Hence, when administered to groups, these measures will 
only pick out those who have the ability to memorize; to 
generalize and evaluate; to give a single solution to a 
problem;  to comprehend certain kinds of verbal and 
numerical relationships that call for single right answers. 
People who do thinking beyond these dimensions are, there­
fore, incorrectly assessed and often appear to be less bright 
or gifted than they really are. If we want to identify 
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producers of knowledge as well as conservers of knowledge,  
we need to heed the caution that the IQ is  not a universal 
measure of giftedness ( 1 9 8 2: 2 3). 
Khatena reports that McNemar ( 1 9 6 4) observes: 
(1 ) creativity tests do not yield high correlations with IQ 
whose uncurtailed scatter would be bivariate normal; 
(2) if suitable criteria measures of literary, architectural, 
or scientific creativity are available, the relationship 
between IQ and creativity, as shown by a scattergram, is 
triangular in shape; therefore, at the high-IQ levels, a 
wide range of scatter for creativity is less and less; and 
(3) having a high IQ does not guarantee creativity, whereas 
having a low IQ means creativity is impossible ( 1 982 :22). 
Now I want to emphasize at this point that tests for general intelligence 
and general creativity are for the most part based on normal distribution. Normal 
distribution is a frequency distribution in which the values or scores group around 
the mean, with the greatest number of cases near the mean and with the 
frequency of cases trailing off on either side of the mean. A perfectly normal 
distribution will give rise to the normal probability curve when plotted. A normal 
probability curve is often referred to as a Bell-Shaped curve, Gaussian curve, or 
probability curve. This is an important consideration because I am convinced 
that creative-intelligence occurs outside of normal distribution; the probability 
of creative-intelligence depends on genetic randomness. It would neither occur 
as a measure of IQ nor of general creativity testing. 
What this means is that creative-intelligence cannot be determined by 
any test based on normal probability. As it occurs, it is a genetic risk. However, 
if its occurrence and development are successful, it can be evaluated in aesthetic 
experience. 
Chapter IV 
IMAGINATIVE-INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVE-INTELLIGENCE, 
AND POETIC INTELLIGENCE 
Webster's gives imagination the definition of: "the act or power of forming 
mental images of what is not actually present; and, the act of power of creating 
mental images of what has never been actually experienced, or of creating new 
images or ideas by combining previous experience." Philosophy differentiates 
imagination as either fancifully, spontaneous, and uncontrolled, or as constructive 
as exemplified by science, invention, and philosophy which is controlled by 
purpose. Psychology views imagination as a process of creating images or 
occurrences without the help of sensory data and is usually considered as of two 
types: fanciful, or aimed. 
According to Khatena (1 98 2), little research has been done on imagery 
formation, especially as it relates to creative imagination (1 982 :1 1 6, 406-408). 
Khatena contends that the study of creative imagination imagery is relatively 
new (1 98 2:406). However, I disagree with Khatena and others in definition: 
Imagination is a separate, although related function, to general creativity and 
general intelligence. For the purposes of this paper, imagination will be defined 
as an intelligence by which an organism experiences consciousness (conscious and 
unconscious workings of the mind) as the bringing about of concrete form to 
abstract thought. Imaginative-intelligence has the power to go beyond such 
abstracts made concrete in fantasy, dream-states,  or contemplation, etc. It can 
determine possibilities for the ordering of a concrete set of perceptual data about 
which the organism is immediately concerned. The process involves both the 
processing of immediately incoming data as well as data in memory unique to 
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the organism's past experiences. This process is termed imaginative-intelligence 
and is differentiated from general intelligence. It is a higher-order of lower­
ordering processes and goes beyond general intelligence. General creativity may 
result from imaginative-intelligence whenever the possibilities are considered to 
be unique expressions of form, but such expressions of form will result more 
often from the workings of the aesthetic sense and the acquired aesthetic � 
in sensual-emotive response to experience. 
Regardless of whether imagination was viewed as a "mysterious power" 
by Coleridge or Blake, as a "divine power" by Michelangelo, or as "exalted reason" 
by Wordsworth, it is being defined, for purposes of this thesis, as the process to 
go beyond a given set of data to determine possibilities of order within such 
data be it in fantasy, dreaming, contemplation, mathematics, etc. Possibilities 
of order within set data, determined by imaginative-intelligence, may range from 
epistemically simple to epistemically complex. Such ordering results from both 
conscious and unconscious activity, constituting, for the most part, the bulk of 
the mind, including all that is of memory. 
Imaginative-intelligence is to be differentiated from general creativity­
general creativity primarily results from sensual-emotive response and socio­
cultural-psychological response, whereas, imaginative-intelligence primarily 
results from a desired effort to epistemically order data. Imaginative-intelligence 
includes operations which begin to formalize a systems approach to the ordering 
of data. It is, for the most part, a process by which data becomes connected, 
operating at higher levels of organization and complexity. These operations are 
basically the result of the organism perceptually connecting data provided by 
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imaginative-intelligence into general systems. A second higher-order lower 
ordering characteristic of i maginative-intelligence is a metaphoric operation 
wherein connections are defined by metaphorical processes which differentiate 
interrelationships and determine significance: Metaphorical differentiation is 
a kind of poetic condensation which results in allegorical description. Poetry, 
mathematical elegance, or literary works such as Thoreau's Walden, serve as 
good examples of aesthetic poetic condensations which are metaphorical 
differentiations. Significance (meaning) is defining of form which carries with 
it a kind of poetic appeal, and is determined by (1 ) the power of the aesthetic 
sense to differentiate, (2) the level of sophistication of the acquired aesthetic 
sense as it relates to the specific, and (3) the power of i maginative-intelligence 
to make metaphoric differentiations. These processes will vary amongst 
organisms according to their greater or lesser abilities. Affinity is to be held 
as a sensual-emotive component of significance. Affinity is an operation wherein 
an organism identifies with behavioral aspects of significance. As Thoreau puts 
it: "A man has not seen a thing who has not felt it . . .  its beauty is its strength." 
Affinity is the feelings-side of imaginative-intelligence. At its most primordial 
level are gut-feelings of rightness and wrongness. 
Poincare (1 908) in his Le Raisonnement Mathematigue, describes the 
properties of imaginative-intelligence and creative-intelligence. He says of 
mathematical creation: 
In fact, what is mathematical creation? It does not consist 
in making new combinations with mathematical entities already 
known. Any one could do that, but the combinations so made 
would be infinite in number and most of them absolutely without 
interest. To create consists precisely in not making useless 
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combinations and in making those which are useful and which 
are only a small minority. Invention is discernment, choice 
( 1 958 :35). 
He continues: 
Among chosen combinations the most fertile will often be 
those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far 
apart. Not that I mean as sufficing for invention the bringing 
together of objects as disparate as possible; most combinations 
so formed would be entirely sterile. But certain among them, 
very rare, are the most fruitful of all (1 958 :35-36). 
Imaginative-intelligence brings about possible combinations but creative-intelligence 
differentiates (chooses) the most useful. Poincare continues to explain the workings 
of creative-intelligence: 
To invent, I have said, is to choose; but the word is perhaps 
not wholly exact. It makes one think of a purchaser before 
whom are displayed a large number of samples, and who 
examines them, one after the other, to make a choice. Here 
the samples would be so numerous that a whole lifetime would 
not suffice to examine them. This is not the actual state of 
things. The sterile combinations do not even present them­
selves to the mind of the inventor. Never in the field of his 
consciousness do combinations appear that are not really 
useful, except some that he rejects but which have to some 
extent the characteristics of useful combinations. All goes 
on as if the inventor were an examiner for the second degree 
who would only have to question the candidates who had passed 
a previous examination (1 958 :36). 
Such workings of creative-intelligence require long and arduous conscious and 
unconscious preparation with aim. Such workings require a well-informed 
acquired aesthetic sense. Poincare continues to describe the relationship of 
significant combinations to the nature of elegance: 
It may be surprising to see emotional sensibility invoked 
� propos of mathematical demonstrations which, it would 
seem ,  can interest only the intellect. This would be to forget 
the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of 
numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. This is a true 
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esthetic feeling that all real mathematicians know, and 
surely it belongs to emotional sensibility (1 9 58:40). 
The "emotional sensibility" to which Poincare refers is what I am ref erring to 
as the sensual-emotive component of significance. And, the choosing of useful 
combinations are the result of affinity: an operation wherein an organism 
identifies with behavorial aspects of significance. Poincare continues: 
Now, what are the mathematic entities to which we 
attribute this character of beauty and elegance, and which 
are capable of developing in us a sort of esthetic emotion? 
They are those whose elements are harmoniously disposed 
so that the mind without effort can embrace their totality 
while realizing the details. This harmony is at once a 
satisfaction of our esthetic needs and an aid to the mind, 
sustaining and guiding. And at the same time, in putting 
under our eyes a well-ordered whole, it makes us foresee 
a mathematical law. Now, as we have said above, the 
only mathematical facts worthy of fixing our attention and 
capable of being useful are those which can teach us a 
mathematical law. So that we reach the following conclusion: 
The useful combinations are precisely the most beautiful, 
I mean those best able to charm this special sensibility that 
all mathematicians know, but of which the profane are so 
ignorant as often to be tempted to smile at it ( 1 95 8 :40). 
When Po in care refers to the "special sensibility" which responds with "esthetic 
emotion," I am to conclude that in definition: (1 ) the "special sensibility" is the 
combined functions of the innate aesthetic sense and the acquired aesthetic 
sense, and (2) "esthetic emotion" is the feelings of rightness or wrongness which 
result from sensual-emotive response to significance. Affinity is merely a way 
of describing an attraction to the workings of significance which cause a kinship 
response of a behavorial nature within the observing organism to such sanguine 
workings. Poincare continues to describe the emergence of significant combinations: 
What happens then? Among the great numbers of combinations 
blindly formed by the subliminal self, almost all are without 
interest and without utility; but just for that reason they are 
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also without effect upon the esthetic sensibility. Conscious­
ness will never know them;  only certain ones are harmonious, 
and, consequently, at once useful and beautiful. They will 
be capable of touching this special sensibility of the geometer 
of which I have just spoken, and which, once aroused, will 
call our attention to them, and thus give them occasion to 
become conscious (1 958:40). 
However, it must be stressed that such combinations must be verified. Poincare 
is careful to point this out: 
. . .  when a sudden illumination seizes upon the mind of a 
mathematician, it usually happens that it does not 
deceive him, but it also sometimes happens, as I have 
said, that it does not stand the test of verification; well, 
we almost always notice that this false idea, had it been 
true, would have gratified our natural feeling for mathe­
matical elegance (1 9 58:40). 
Now, it is also true, that the same holds for any metaphorical explanation-be 
it mathematical, literary, or poetic: "had it been true, [it ] would have gratified 
our natural feeling for . . .  elegance." This is why it is most i mportant to consider 
the nature of significance as a descriptive element of elegance. 
However, these two operations of higher-order ordering, that of i maginative-
intelligence and creative-intelligence, will rarely be experienced, and will only 
be found in aesthetic experience. 
Creative-intelligence is dependent upon the workings of i maginative-intelli-
gence. Creative-intell igence brings about elegant orders which are epistemologically 
structured and which result in aesthetic experience. Metaphorical differentiation, 
significance, affinity, and verification assist the processes of creative-intelligence. 
However, there is inherent in such processes, a kind of higher-order intelligence 
which needs further definition. To this kind of intel1 igence, I give the term 
poetic-intelligence. What we are now considering are the following kinds of 
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intelligences which are interdependent and represent an intelligence faculty: 
(1) general intelligence, (2) imaginative-intelligence, (3) creative-intelligence, 
and (4) poetic-intelligence. General and imaginative-intelligences are lower-order 
ordering intelligences; creative and poetic intelligences are higher-order ordering 
intelligences. All four intelligences are necessary to bring about aesthetic experience. 
Poetic-intelligence concerns itself with the wisdom of form.  Wisdom means 
the sophistication and refinement of epistemological concepts. Sophistication is 
to be held as the most complete state of epistemological conceptualization; whereas, 
refinement is to be held as defining elegance in its most complete state. Wisdom 
of form, which results from poetic-intelligence, is a consideration for the evaluation 
and verification of aesthetic experience. It is the kind of wisdom which remains 
constant in a culture as long as it is needed for explanation. 
Eiseley expresses such a fact: "The history of science is as full of abandoned 
sinkholes as a cavern. Theories emerge, have their moment, and vanish or on the 
otherhand, are slowly transformed into greater syntheses. Sometimes ideas 
regarded impossible have a way of conquering a later generation" (1 97 5: 1 8 5-1 86). 
A good example of the latter is Mendel's (1 86 5) theory upon the nature of inheritance. 
Eiseley speaks of Mendel: 
Mendel is a curious wraith in history. His associates, his 
followers, are all in the next century. That is when his 
influence began. Yet if we are to understand him and the 
way in which he eventually rescued Darwinism itself from 
oblivion we must go the long way back to Brunn in Moravia 
and stand among the green peas in a quiet garden. Gregor 
Mendel had a strange fate: he was destined to live one 
life painfully in the flesh at Brunn and another, the intel­
lectual life of which he dreamed, in the following century. 
His words, his calculations were to take a sudden belated 
flight out of the dark tomblike volumes and be written on 
hundreds of university blackboards, and go on spinning 
through innumerable heads (1 96 1 : 2 1 1 ). 
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Aesthetic building blocks are viewed as that which helps define the history of 
thought of whatever discipline. Loren Eiseley in his autobiography (1 97 5), talks 
about doing the research for Darwin's Century (1 95 8); he tells us of how painfully 
aware he became of those who provided stepping stones to greater understandings: 
"I became ever more conscious of the forgotten men who work to produce change 
before change comes about" (1 975 :1 88). He tells us: 
Ideas do not spring full-blown from a single brain. There 
has to be wandering along bypaths, midnight reading, and 
sustained effort (1 97 5 : 1 8 6). 
He continues: 
As one gazes in retrospect upon the swirling cloud wraiths 
which closed the eighteenth century and ushered in the nine­
teenth, it becomes apparent how difficult it is to assign so 
intricate a scientific alteration of our world view to a single 
man magnified beyond human proportions. More recently 
the intellectual historian has come to see that scientific 
models of reality are remarkably complex in their origins 
and in their manner of transformation. While in no sense 
denigrating the achievements of the great masters of science, 
we have to recognize the truth spoken by the first of the atom 
breakers, Lord Rutherford. "It is not in the nature of things," 
said Rutherford, "for any one man to make a sudden violent 
discovery; science goes step by step and every man depends 
on the work of his predeccessors. When you hear of a sudden 
unexpected discovery-a bolt from the blue, as it were-you 
can always be sure that it has grown up by the influence of 
one man on another, and it is the mutual influence which makes 
the enormous possibility of scientific advance." These are the 
words of a scientist, but very similar and equally modest expres­
sions have emanated from the great artist Joshua Reynolds, 
Jacques Loeb, the brilliant experimental physiologist, was fond 
of quoting the dictum of his equally distinguished botanical 
mentor, Julius von Sachs, that "all originality comes from 
reading." 
Sir Francis Bacon once spoke of those drawn into some 
powerful circle of thought as "dancing in little rings like 
persons bewitched." Our scientific models do stimulate a 
kind of fairy ring or magic circle which, once it has encom­
passed us, is hard to view objectively. Truth is elusive. 
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Perhaps William James put things most felicitously when 
he said, "The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may 
be the rest of our truths" (1 975 : 1 86-1 87). 
Poetic-intelligence is that which allows one to break into "little rings." Eiseley 
concludes: 
When contradictory truths multiply, one is forced to recognize 
a certain mockery written into the very fabric of nature. Our 
eyes would have to possess as many facets as those of an insect 
to perceive at once the relativity of truth itself. Bemused by 
that old century behind us, I had followed the dancers from 
one toadstool ring to another. I observed the transition and as 
I did so I became ever more conscious of the forgotten men 
who work to produce change before change comes about (1 975 :  
1 8 8). 
Poetic-intelligence is that which allows for the recognition of the wisdom of forms 
as they appear in "little rings"; and, creative-intelligence is that which allows for 
the breaking out of the same "little rings. n 
Since thought takes concrete form in many varying ways-mathematics, 
poetry, literature, art, etc.-it is necessary to understand common wisdoms 
amongst each if an over-all understanding of the interdependency and inter-
relationship of knowledge structures are to be put into perspective and a 
historical completeness is to be realized. This is a most difficult and complex 
task, but one which is necessary for creative-intelligence leading to discovery. 
The workings of the aesthetic sense and the refined knowledge of the 
acquired aesthetic sense will give vision to poetic-intelligence. Poetic-intelligence 
is thus both an innate and acquired capacity to bring about recognition of those 
characteristics of form which are poetically wise. I suppose, to this quality, I could 
attribute the idea of artistic-appearance. In this respect, artistic appearance would 
be poetic impression-the impression that a concrete form would give in poetic 
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terms. Since this is a most difficult and complex concept, let me offer two 
brief examples of that which would epistemically illustrate poetic-intelligence. 
These examples are also those which are the result of creative-intelligence. 
Since I happen to be quite fond of Thoreau, I shall use something by him in 
introduction. Thoreau tells us of this kind of poetic wisdom to which I refer: 
There is no doubt that the loftiest written wisdom is 
either rhymed, or in some way musically measured, -is, in 
form as well as substance, poetry; and a volume which 
should contain the condensed wisdom of mankind, need not 
have one rhythmless line (1 966 : 108). 
Darwin gives us an example from science when he uses a simile to describe natural 
selection as a "great tree": 
The affinities of all the beings of the same class have 
sometimes been represented by a great tree. I believe this 
simile largely speaks the truth. The green and budding 
twigs may represent existing species; and those produced 
during each former year may represent the long succession 
of extinct species. At each period of growth all the growing 
twigs have tried to branch out on all sides, and to overtop 
and kill the surrounding twigs and branches, in the same 
manner as species and groups of species have tried to over­
master other species in the great battle for life. The limbs 
divided into great branches, and these into lesser and lesser 
branches, were themselves once, when the tree was small, 
budding twigs; and this connexion of the former and present 
buds by ramifying branches may well represent the classifi­
cation of all extinct and living species in groups subordinate to 
groups. Of the many twigs which flourished when the tree 
was a mere bush, only two or three, now grown into great 
branches, yet survive and bear all the other branches; so 
with the species which lived during long-past geological 
periods, very few now have living and modified descendants. 
From the first growth of the tree, many a limb and branch 
has decayed and dropped off; and those lost branches of 
various sizes may represent those whole orders, families and 
genera which have now no living representatives, and which 
are known to us only from having been found in a fossil state. 
As we here and there see a thin straggling branch springing 
from a fork low down in a tree, and which by some chance 
has been favoured and is still alive on its summit, so we 
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occasionally see an animal like the Ornithorhynchus or 
Lepidosiren, which in some small degree connects by 
its affinities two large branches of life,  and which has 
apparently been saved from fatal competition by having 
inhabited a protected station. As buds give rise by growth 
to fresh buds, and these, if vigorous, branch out and over­
top on all sides many a feebler branch, so by generation I 
believe it has been with the great Tree of Life, which 
fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the 
earth, and covers the surface with its ever branching and 
beautiful ramifications (1 97 5:1 7 1-1 7 2). 
And, from Thoreau, a second example of poetic wisdom written metaphorically: 
The sea-shore is a sort of neutral ground, a most 
advantageous point from which to contemplate this 
world. It is even a trivial place. The waves forever 
rolling to the land are too far-travelled and untamable 
to be familar. Creeping along the endless beach amid 
the sun-squall and the foam, it occurs to us that we, too, 
are the product of sea-slime. 
It is a wild, rank place, and there is no flattery in it. 
Strewn with crabs, horse-shoes, and razor-clams, and 
whatever the sea casts up, -a vast morgue, where famished 
dogs may range in packs, and crows come daily to glean the 
pittance which the tide leaves them. The carcasses of men, 
rotting and bleaching in the sun and waves, and each tide 
turns them in their beds, and tucks fresh sand under them. 
There is naked Nature, inhumanly sincere, wasting no 
thought on man, nibbling at the cliffy shore where gulls 
whell amid the spray (1 966 :21  7). 
Poetic intelligence is characteristic of any great work, be it mathematical, 
scientific, literary, or artistic-it carries with it a kind of sublimity of language 
or form.  Such sublime elements of form define elegance in its most noble and 
lofty state. The recognition of poetic impressions inherent in form, such as 
given by Darwin's, "a thin straggling branch springing from a fork low down in a 
tree .. .  " or, Thoreau's, "we, too, are the product of sea-slime . . .  " require the 
working of an innate aesthetic sense which is sensitive to such poetic sublimity 
or the workings of the acquired aesthetic sense which would be especially 
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sensitive to such poetry. An acquired aesthetic sense will not, unless there is 
an innate tendency toward sensual-emotive response to poetic form, carry with 
it a sensitivity to poetry. Aesthetic experience will not reach consum mation 
without such workings. 
Chapter V 
HYPOTHESIS: A DESCRIPTIVE AN AL YSIS 
This thesis is limited, imperfect, and incomplete. The very nature of 
its scope deems this necessary. The thesis presented gives only general 
explanations and conclusions at which I have arrived. In the future, I intend to 
provide in a dissertation detail and more complete explanations and conclusions. 
This thesis is presented somewhat as argument and includes brief references to 
the difficulties encountered in giving argument and definition to its hypothesis. 
Although general in definition, the hypothesis is complex in description-much 
will remain somewhat obscure, but I, with only the most serious of intent, off er 
the best of which I am capable. It is my contention that all most all definitions, 
descriptions, and measurements, for creative-intelligence (of which aesthetics 
is a part) are erroneously m isleading and refer to general creativity. 
Most definitions of general intelligence are without clear definition. 
However, it will not be the concern of this thesis to dwell on definitions of 
general intelligence and general creativity, for the thrust of the thesis is to give 
focus and definition to creative-intelligence which is best recognized in aesthetic 
experience viewed as an epistemological concept. Thus, the hypothesis of the 
thesis is stated as follows: The aesthetic experience is held to be epistemological 
experience in its most elegant and complete state and comes about as the result 
of creative and poetic intelligence. The human organism experiences the complexity 
of systems as elegant and epistemically ordered as specific and aesthetic. 
I am fully convinced that definitions, descriptions, and measurements for 
creative-intelligence occur far from equilibrium in specificity-apart from 
Gaussian distribution-and are best recognized in aesthetic experience. I am 
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convinced that creative specificity, when it occurs, establishes its own 
distribution. If creative-intelligence is to be located, it is to be located far 
from equilibrium-independent of normal distributions-and in the form of 
specificity having its own evolving distribution. 
It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to gain insight into the means 
of such a differentiation which defines itself as a sym metry-making property 
inherent in disequilibrium,  and which begins to define itself in the form of a 
new and differentiated emergent form, occuring sometime after numerous 
bifurcations. It is my expressed conclusion, that not all bifurcations will lead 
to creative specificity, or to the emergence of creative-intelligence which will 
act other than as a genetic risk. Bifurcation is viewed as life's constant 
struggle to exercise continuous evolutional processes in response to a necessity 
to move to higher orders of complexity in search for steady states which allow 
for a continued survival response to forced states of temporary chaotic 
complexity. I conclude, that there is no assurance that self-organization will 
occur beyond continuous states of instability. It appears to me that higher 
order complexity will ultimately lead to diffused states, wherein the original 
nature of a bifurcation will disengage and disperse into an environment as 
undifferentiated energy. This I view to be the property of extinction or the 
end to a mutation. 
The kind of creativity which concerns this thesis is one which survives 
symmetry-breaking and which I have termed creative-intelligence. It is held 
that rarely in the dynamic processes of disequilibrium and bifurcation will 
symmetry-breaking lead to creative-intelligence emerging far from equilibrium. 
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What does emerge, for the most part, are higher orders of complexity, or 
extinction, or the end to a mutation. Measures for general intelligence and 
general creativity (Binet, Terman, Weschler, Guildford, Torrance) have used 
Gaussian-based models to test for general intelligence and general creativity. 
However, since I have concluded that Gaussian distribution does not identify 
creative specificity, it is to be thought that such measures are erroneous 
measurements for creative-intelligence. 
Creative-intelligence viewed in this light is extremely rare. Still, it is 
held to be a very powerful kind of intelligence which brings about order to 
highly complex ongoings of experience. The tendency of most organisms is 
to aspire to equilibrium-for with each experience of a bifurcation, complexity 
increases without assurance of a forthcoming equilibrium. With each 
bifurcation and reorganization, the organism risks extinction or the end to 
a mutation-therefore, it is most seriously concluded, that to arrive at a 
perfected state of creative specificity is a genetic risk; and, the probability 
of creative-intelligence depends on genetic randomness. 
Art is a primordial tendency to order up sensual-emotive data in 
response to experience. Science as a primordial tendency is the desire to 
investigate things about which the organism is most curious. Scientific method 
is an acquired sophisticated method, usually culture bound, by which to 
conduct inquiry. When imaginative processes become active in either of the 
primordial activities of art or science, in most cases mental functions occur 
which are of a higher-order, and which will usually result in general creativity 
response. The move from lower-order ordering activities to higher-order 
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ordering activities, as we shall see, is a shift from the primordial tendencies 
of art and science, to general imaginative-creative processes. General 
imaginative-creative processes are dependent upon general intelligence. 
Transitional moves from lower-order ordering to higher-order ordering are not 
hierarchical moves, and do not reflect developmental stages, patterns, or steps. 
These moves are experiential perceptual workings inherent in the organism's 
capacity to "get along" in its environment. The demands of the environment 
will solicit such workings. However, it must be understood that these workings 
are in a constant state of evolution and will show greater or lesser intensities 
in time. The organism must be seen as struggling to emerge successfully in 
order that it can successfully deal with environmental demands. Consequently, 
depending upon environmental circumstances, organisms will vary in perceptual 
strength. In other words, some organisms will be forced to exercise capacities 
to a greater or lesser extent to meet environmental demands as they struggle 
to become successful survivors. 
The aesthetic sense and the acquired aesthetic sense are crucial ordering 
capacities common to all organisms. These capacities bring about initial 
perceptual lower-orderings which will later be highly influential in determining 
higher-orderings. These capacities operate both consciously and unconsciously. 
The innate aesthetic sense is a synthesis operation involving all sensual-emotive 
systems and organs. These systems and organs are interdependent operations 
and give the organism the capacity to formulate instinctively, uniquely-ordered 
precepts, which for the most part will generally correspond to that which is 
being experienced. The organism is naturally equipped to perceive something 
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of order in colour, balance, rhythm, shape, depth, sound, temperature, movement, 
location, etc. The innate aesthetic sense gives the organism a sense of equilibrium 
or disequilibrium:  It gives the organism a basic sense of its physical and mental 
state of affairs. 
The acquired aesthetic sense is an acquired capacity and highly dependent 
upon the workings of the innate aesthetic sense. It is sociocultural and 
psychological in origin. Its content, for the most part, is determined by the 
standards of sociocultural order as well as recall data based on the organism's 
unique experiences. It is the composite of a man's sociocultural and psychological 
heritage. An example of a standard cultural order would be calculus. Another 
example would be democracy. These cultural standards reflect norms and 
mores of a civilization and have been determ ined by past societal experiences 
which have been organized into paradigms and world views representative of a 
people. These cultural standards are transferred primarily through educational 
practices. However, an organism's own unique experiences contribute greatly 
to the content. This must be understood as vital and necessary for a society, 
especially for a highly complex social order for it brings coherence to a group. 
For the most part, the function of the acquired aesthetic sense is 
dependent upon the organism's own experiential evolution: It defines the 
organism's past history of experience. The basic temperament of the organism 
influences the organism's tendency to pay attention to some aspects of 
experience over others-however, a social sense ultimately becomes the greater 
influence. As an organism matures, its basic temperament flowers into 
personality which is the overall sociobiological, cultural, and psychological 
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persona of the organism. It is represented in the acquired aesthetic sense. 
The nature of the acquired aesthetic sense is not static, but dynamic. It 
continues to expand its content until the death of the organism. Its nature 
greatly influences behavior and decision. 
Experiences which are primordial in origin are basically of two types: 
(1 ) primordial artistic, and (2) primordial scientific. Primordial artistic 
experiences are lower-order ordering experiences which result in sensual-emotive 
response governed by the aesthetic sense. Primordial scientific experiences are 
lower-order ordering experiences of investigation which center on things which 
are found to arouse the organism's curiosity. Both primordial experiences are 
experiences which are necessary to order perception. Both experiences give 
the organism a lower-order sense of the structure of things, which for the 
most part, constitutes information about shape, weight, texture, colour, position, 
rhythm, pitch and tone, etc. It is during such primordial experiences that an 
organism establishes feelings toward objects and occurrences. 
These primordial experiences are exercised with little forethought or 
afterthought. Now if the organism were to intensify such experiences-make 
them more complex-then its awareness would become more acute and its 
perceptions more complex. If it be deemed necessary for an organism to take 
command of such complexity and arrive at some sort of conceptual completion, 
it would have to increase the workings of conscious and unconscious processes 
in an attempt to go beyond lower-order perceptual data. Some sort of 
contemplation would begin to take place. However, no organism will allow 
complexity greater than it is able to order successfully. It can use all kinds of 
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mental gymnastics to avoid disequilibrium, such as repression, sublimation, 
rationalization, etc. ,  as well as, agression, violence, annihilation, etc. One 
other aspect of lower-order contemplation would be an increase in language 
use, especially in the form of internal dialogue and imagery formation. 
Language and imagery formation are perceptual ordering tools. I understand 
that it is commonly held that symbolism or symbol formation is involved at 
this level. However, I am firmly convinced that symbols are not static, but 
dynamic, and, therefore, the discussion of symbol formation is an erroneous 
consideration for this argument. 
Now if the organism continues to experience an increase in complexity, 
and its desire to know is correlate, then it is required to speculate as to 
possible solutions or explanations. To speculate is, as I deem it, the beginnings 
of lower-order intelligence with its origin in the capacity to imagine. I ref er to 
this as imaginative-intelligence, which is a capacity to go beyond a given set 
of data to determine possible structuring for such data. It is now that the 
aesthetic sense and the acquired aesthetic become more refined as processes 
for perceptual ordering beyond mere sensual appearances. Since the organism's 
sensual-emotive perceptual capacities are limited, imaginative-intelligence 
assists with the going beyond such limitations through speculation. An example 
of keenly extending the power of imaginative-intelligence to a higher-order 
would be the creation of formal mathematical concepts. Formal mathematical 
concepts give the organism even greater power to overcome lower-order 
perceptual limitations. Mathematics is a "perceptual ordering tool" which 
enables the organism to arrive at even greater and more refined speculations 
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about the true nature of things. A highly sophisticated form of imaginative­
intelligence speculation would be hypothesis and theory. The most intense and 
perfect form of imaginative-intelligence is to be found in the aesthetic 
experience which is defined by elegance. An elegant theory would be the 
most intense and perfect form of perceptual order as well as the most intense 
and perfect form of aesthetic experience. 
Now the exercise of imaginative-intelligence-the going beyond a given 
set of perceptual data to determine possibilities of perceptual structure-presents 
itself as the organism's deviation from primordial activities of art and science. 
It is a much more refined behavior and gives the organism higher-order ordering 
powers. These higher-order ordering powers are considered human characteristics 
of intelligence. The exercise of higher-order imaginative-intelligence powers 
differentiate man from other living things as human-but this is not to say he 
is alone in having these powers: The song of bird is no less the song of man. 
Imaginative-intelligence is dependent upon how well the organism was 
able to exercise perceptual ordering capacities during primoridal artistic and 
scientific experiences; i maginative-intelligence is dependent upon how well-stored 
these experiences are in memory. Memory-storage and recall-are fountainheads, 
not only for general intelligence and general creativity, but also, for 
i maginative-intelligence, creative-intelligence and poetic-intelligence. Since 
experience is accumulative, it has continuous power to influence all mental 
functions. The exercise of lower-order ordering of imaginative-intelligence is 
primordial and merely allows the organis m  to begin to recognize and determine 
patterns and relationships beyond sensual-emotive data. 
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Imaginative-intelligence allows the organism to go beyond a given set 
of data to determine possible structures within such data, and this activity 
begins, first, by establishing patterns and relationships beyond sensual-emotive 
data-appearances beyond sensual-emotive patterns and relationships akin to 
past primordial artistic and scientific experience. Imaginative-intelligence 
is an exercised capacity to reach beyond lower-order perceptual limitations 
and simple knowledge structures in a desire to know more and reach some kind 
of simple consummation. Experimentation, the probing of Nature by man, is 
trial and error investigation and making, and probably becomes much more 
intense at this point, as do mental activities set in motion by conscious and 
unconscious lower-order contemplation. It must be remembered, that these are 
not hierarchical processes. All processes thus discussed are continually operant 
and made available for more intense and complex use if necessary. All processes 
are interdependent and one cannot be activated without affecting the workings 
of all others. 
Therefore, if lower-order workings of imagination-intelligence do not 
sufficiently give perceptual satisfaction to an organism's desire to know, then 
the organism may become so motivated as to increase the workings of 
imaginative-intelligence in an attempt to arrive at greater perceptual 
completeness. Usually, but not always, this desire to know more is motivated 
by feelings of dissatisfaction, the need to survive, or to gain power; however, 
it can be motivated by pleasurable feelings of just knowing, but this is rare. 
Now lower-order workings of imaginative-intelligence, which bring about 
perceptual awarenesses of patterns, relationships, and connections within 
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sensual-emotive data, do not include an awareness of significance. Significance, 
or meaning, is not ascribed to order at lower-levels. These awarenesses of 
order are certainly of a lower-higher order than those which are primordial and 
sensual, but they are not differentiated in terms of significance. In order that 
the organism attribute significance to such imaginative-intelligence orderings, 
it must activate the powers of the aesthetic and acquired aesthetic sense in their 
most refined form, which is in the form of poetic-intelligence. Here I am not 
talking about sensations, feelings, psychological needs and wants-these are all 
response. I ref er to significance as an acute and penetrating understanding of 
highly complex natures of things. However, significance certainly includes the 
workings of sensual-emotive response and sociocultural and psychological 
orderings of memory. 
Poetic-intelligence, most rare, occurs when the organism deems that its 
knowledge base is weak and lacks in wisdom. The organism may then be 
motivated to increase its data base by seeking and/or providing for a necessary 
meaningful consummation. At this point, the organism's level of existence 
is most intense and has become highly complex. The organism, in this state of 
complexity will have to exercise its capacity to reorganize and increase its 
data base, and now begin to exercise its powers to create. However rare it 
might be, the capacity to create is an innate higher-order capacity which gives 
epistemological form to perception. It attempts to bring elegance to form-it 
attempts to make the complex, simple and complete. 
It is now that the organism may, perchance, decide to order up the 
complex in a number of ways. If it be so bent toward the artistic, the form of 
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the ordering will most often be in the form of a work of art. If it be so bent 
toward the scientific, the form will often show itself in the form of 
hypothesis or theory. Regardless of whether the form be artistic or 
scientific, the attempt here, is to bring about epistemological and elegant 
completion to culminate in a kind of meaningful consummation in the form of 
a tangible-ordering of highly complex experiential and perceptual data made 
simple. 
Organisms which have the powers of creative-intelligence are 
biologically driven in greater or lesser degree to arrive at perceptual 
completeness. If conditions are not conducive to the organism's success, it 
can not make connections necessary to bring about significance amongst large 
numbers of variables to which it innately responds and retains. Such an 
organism arrives at a kind of intellectual discipline by its very nature: It is 
forced to survive by overcoming overwhelming complexity to which it is 
innately sensitive in response. To do otherwise would lead to unbearable 
confusion fostering neurosis and psychosis, and in some cases, death. It is 
forced to master complexity and excessive bifurcations; it must bring about 
self-organizing properties to establish equilibrium. However, when successful, 
it was most equipped to do so. Out of this need to organize comes epistemo­
logical structuring of the highest order. It is here that the innate aesthetic 
sense of the organism must present itself as highly sensitive to form for the 
organism will most surely depend upon it for poetic differentiations. 
It is important to understand that creative-intelligence is a rare 
genetic occurrence which when successful enables an organism, sensitive to 
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large numbers of incoming sensual-emotive data, the power to organize. This 
kind of creative-intelligence does not blow "willy-nilly in the wind" seeking 
novel results-that is more the nature of general creativity. What it seeks 
are epistemological orders for specific sets of interrelated data or knowledge 
systems and it is highly selective in the process. The selectivity inherent in 
the creative process, for the most part, is done by the aesthetic sense. Yeats, 
Poincare, and others, have told us that such a process of selection is attributed, 
as in Yeat's case, "to instinct," and in Poincare's case, to an "esthetic sensibility." 
The refined operations of the aesthetic sense bring about a natural response 
to poetic form.  
Although, initially, the organism is  forced to depend upon 
creative-intelligence workings to order up highly complex and numerous 
incoming sensual-emotive data in order that it attempt to avoid confusion 
and states of disequilibrium, it can in time, use its creative powers to order 
up any complex set of data it so desires. This kind of avoidance of confusion 
must not be taken as the kind of confusion which characterizes schizophrenia. 
It is not accompanied by hallucinations or manic-depressive states or whatever 
else is usually ascribed to such a sickness. It is just as possible that one who 
has the powers of creative-intelligence may also have some sort of mental 
illness, but it must not be confused with creative-intelligence and its workings. 
If anything, such illnesses would be highly detrimental to its success and, I would 
dare say, cause an unbearable state of mental affairs for an organism. 
Creative-intelligence is a very powerful answer to ordering highly complex 
data to completion. It is a most erroneous practice to treat creative-intelligence 
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as the outcome of some sort of mental illness, for it is the very opposite of 
mental illness. Still, today, the attempt to do so is widespread. 
Poetic-intelligence, the sensitivity to the wisdom of form,  does not 
always accompany creative-intelligence. When it does, it provides the greatest 
of aesthetic experience. Two examples of such a combination of creative and 
poetic intelligence are Thoreau's Walden, and Darwin's The Origin of Species. 
In art an excellent example would be the fresco paintings by Michelangelo 
on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in Rome; in physics, Einstein's E=Mc2 ; and, 
in biology, Mendel's monumental and single work with peas in Brunn. These 
works carry with them a poetic elegance of form and most certainly are the 
result of creative-intelligence with aim. 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSION 
This conclusion need only be brief. 
Man is no more natural than the world. In reality he 
is, as we have seen, the creator of a phantom universe, 
the universe we call culture-a formidable realm of 
cloud shapes, ideas, potentialities, gods, and cities, 
which with man's death will collapse into dust and 
vanish back into "expected nature" (Eiseley, 1 970 :1 20). 
Man, modern man, has created a phantom universe based on science-content 
without meaning-a continuation of Bacon's dream: the desire that man's 
quest for solutions to problems be institutionalized-that unanswered problems 
not wait for genius-that scientific method itself would discover Nature (Eiseley, 
1 970 :53-94). 
General intelligence gives us understandings of a culture we have created 
but it does not take us beyond that culture. Imaginative-intelligence, the stuff 
of dreams, takes us beyond the appearance of that w hich is given by general 
intelligence-it gives wings to fanciful thought in' utopian verse. It is the 
beginnings of discovery. But it is creative-intelligence which allows men to 
discover consistently; although, oftentimes, what is discovered merely deepens 
the grave of the phantom universe. 
The answers that Bacon desired from science are found in poetic 
wisdom--however rare such wisdom be, without such w isdom, content is empty 
of meaning. "In the abstract language of mathematics," Barnett tells us, "he can 
describe how things behave though he does not know-or need to know-what 
they are" (1 979:36). Barnett continues: 
Einstein carried this train of logic to its ultimate limits 
by showing that even space and time are forms of intuition, 
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which can no more be divorced from consciousness 
than can our accounts of color, shape, or size. Space 
has no objective reality except as an order or arrange­
ment of the objects we perceive in it, and time has no 
independent existence apart from the order of events 
by which we measure it. 
These philosophical subtleties have a profound 
bearing on modern science. For along with the 
philosopher's reduction of all objective reality to a 
shadow-world of perceptions, scientists became 
aware of the alarming limitations of man's senses 
(1 979 : 19-20). 
Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu. Science has been pushed 
to accept sensory perception and experience as considerations of scientific 
observation and investigation. Barnett tells us: 
Man's inescapable impasse is that he himself is 
part of the world he seeks to explore; his body and 
proud brain are mosaics of the same elemental 
particles that compose the dark, drifting clouds of 
interstellar space; he is, in the final analysis, merely 
an uphemeral conformation of the primordial space­
time field. Standing midway between macrocosm 
and microcosm he finds barriers on every side . . .  
(1 97 9:1 1 7-1 1 8). 
To admit limitations of a scientific-artistic intelligence is profound. It forces 
modern man to confront himself and Darwinian Evolution-"his body and proud 
brain are mosaics of the same elemental particles that compose the dark, 
drifting clouds of interstellar space . . .  " To separate hi mself from meaning is to 
experience emptiness of content: 
In trying to distinguish appearance from reality and lay 
bare the fundamental structure of the universe, science 
has had to transcent the "rabble of the senses." But its 
highest edifices, Einstein has pointed out, have been 
"purchased at the price of emptiness of content." A theore­
tical concept is emptied of content to the very degree that 
it is divorced from sensory experience. For the only world 
man can truly know is the world created for hi m by his 
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senses. If he expunges all the impressions which 
they translate and memory stores, nothing is 
left (1 979 :1 1 3-1 1 4). 
Man is now more than scientific man-he is man artistic. His ultimate and most 
lofty searches for answers demand creative powers. The search for the 
mysterious keys to unlock the transcending powers of creativity in every man 
has become as Bacon's dream, the dream of modern man: The need to 
institutionalize creative powers which beget intellectual power. However, the 
powers of creative-intelligence belong to rare and random occurrence-and, when 
such powers are successful, they too are imperfect and primordial. Eiseley tells 
us: 
That the manifestations of genius are culturally 
controlled we are well aware. The urban world, in all 
its diversity, provides a background, a cultural base, 
without which-whatever may be hidden in great 
minds-creativity would have had to seek other and 
more ephemeral expression or remain mute. Yet no 
development in art or scientific theory from the 
upper Stone Age onward seems to have demanded 
any further development in the brain of man. Mathe­
matical theory, science, the glories of art lurked 
hidden as the potential seeds of the universe itself, 
in the minds of children rocked to sleep by cave fires 
in ice-age Europe (1 97 1 : 2 1 5). 
However primordial the beginnings of genius, it is the outcome of creative 
and poetic intelligence, and its probability of occurring depends on genetic 
randomness. It is a genetic risk. But Bacon's cryptic scientific dream repeats 
itself now with a desire to make creative-intelligence common method in 
laboratories: 
If genius is a purely biological phenomenon one must 
assume that the chance of its appearance should increase 
with the size of populations. Yet it is plain that, as with 
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toadstools which spring up in the night in fairy 
rings and then vanish, there is some delicate soil 
which nurtures genius-the cultural circumstance 
and the play of minds must meet. It is not a 
matter of population statistics alone, else there 
would not have been so surprising an efforescence 
of genius in fifth-century Greece-a thing we still 
marvel at in our vastly expanded world. Darwin 
com mitted to biological explanations alone, was 
left fumbling uncertainly with a problem that was 
essentially not reducible to a simplistic biological 
explanation. Without ignoring the importance of 
biology as one aspect of an infinitely complicated 
subject, therefore, the modern researcher f avers 
the view that the intensive examination of the 
creative mind and its environment may off er some 
hope of stimulating the sources from which it springs, 
or, at the very least, of nurturing it more carefully 
(1 97 1 : 2 1 6). 
But how nurture it more carefully? Perhaps it can be nurtured if successful, but 
I doubt much if it can be manipulated. One of its characteristics is that it is 
keenly perceptive and penetrating. However, the results of creative-intelligence 
most certainly can and have been used in ways not intended by genius. 
I have concluded, creative-intelligence will best be measured in 
aesthetic experience, which fortunately means such experience is in the past. 
Nevertheless, Bacon's "scientific society" has reached description, and it is in 
man's best interest to heed its outcome as he ponders creative powers. Eiseley 
describes modern man's scientific society which may perhaps, someday echo 
modern man's "creative society": 
In simple terms, the rise of a scientific society means 
a society of constant expectations directed toward the 
oncoming future. What we have is always second best, 
what we expect to have is "progress." What we seek, in 
the end, is Utopia. In endless pursuit of the future we 
have ended by engaging to destroy the present (1 970:1 05). 
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If creative powers are viewed as anything, they are viewed commonly as that 
which will ultimately bring about the "Utopia" which modern man so 
desperately seeks. Although man needs no more than what general intelligence 
gives him to move silently with other animals of a rain forest, modern man's 
phantom universe requires much more. It requires that he confront himself 
as he who has come to look upon the rain forest as a thing outside himself: 
"an object to be manipulated or discarded at will" (1 970 :59). 
The sensitivities which come about as the result of creative and poetic 
intelligence are not widespread amongst men. Such sensitivities give man 
an understanding, as it was with Thoreau and Darwin, that he must move 
silently with other animals of a rain forest if he is to survive. What were 
primordial tendencies to art and science have become struggling chi mera deep 
in the more ancient and instinctive fossil parts of man's brain. The fossil brain 
lies sleeping in most-the new brain has emerged with a modern-scientific-sense. 
Primordial tendencies to art and science are lost to ice sheets along with hairy 
mam moths and long-horned bison. What was purely experiential is now culture 
bound to modern myths of science and art. Somewhere the past grew mutant 
amongst 537 in viscid mud of Darwin's cup. Modern man cannot but speculate 
as to the significance of paintings in Lauscau Cave galleries-he can no longer 
rally thoughts long asleep in the silence of earth carried by bird feet. 
As I have defined aesthetic experience, plastic art is a strange sort of 
experience which has evolved as rarely aesthetic. The example of art which 
constitutes aesthetic experience are the fresco paintings by Michelangelo. 
The reasons for citing the frescos in example are as follows: 
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1 .  There is an epistemological order for narrative aspects of the 
frescos as well as for elements of art such as line, shape, colour, 
etc. Both orders are epistemologically complex and elegant. 
2 .  In terms of conception and execution there was required acute 
intelligence operations of the general, i maginative, creative, and 
poetic. Perceptual workings culminated in forms which are refined 
and sophisticated. Intelligence and skill were of the highest order. 
3.  The works provide new artistic knowledge structures, new intellectual 
concepts, and are by their nature, discovery. They result in a work 
of eminence and represent an aesthetic building block which carries 
with it a kind of poetic-intelligence. 
However, the reason why I hold the plastic arts in general as limited in 
aesthetic example is because most art appears as vehicles for ( 1 )  the com munication 
of sociocultural beliefs; (2) sensual-emotive response in the form of socio-psycho-
logical expressions; and (3) perceptual ordering of data to make the abstract 
(thought, sensation, feeling) concrete. For the most part, works of art which 
are plastic tend to be offerings of bits and pieces of isolated-fragmented-
egocentric-abstract perceptual data with an aim to express sensual-emotive, 
socio-psychological, and sociocultural sensations, feelings, and thoughts as 
concrete. In general, such art works are w ithout aim of providing epistemological 
structures which are complex and elegant knowledge systems. One exception 
to such works would be Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel fresco paintings. 
This is not to say that perceptual data of most art works are void of aim, 
it is merely to say that such perceptual data are barren of far-reaching-poetic 
elegance and are significantly limited in meaning. However, when art works are 
aesthetically ordered, they are profoundly aesthetic. And Michelangelo's Sistine 
Chapel fresco paintings are profoundly aesthetic. 
-65-
It must be understood that when it is held that a work be complex in 
order that it be aesthetic, it does not mean complex in appearance but complex 
in conceptualization or understanding. The physical appearance or apparent 
mechanics may be very simple in statement, but the arrival at such a simple 
statement must have demanded highly complex operations if it is to be elegant 
and representative of aesthetic experience. Such operations would have to 
include combined and interdependent-workings of intelligence of the general, 
imaginative, creative, and poetic. And far superior the work of art which 
displays poetry of wisdom!  
This thesis addresses works of art which are included in a definition of 
that which represents aesthetic experience;  however, if  one were to address 
works of art other than those which are included in the aesthetic, a different 
criterion would be in order. I believe, Herbert Read and others have provided 
ample criteria by which one can make such evaluative judgements. However, it 
is not the intent of this thesis to make such examinations. Such works have 
received immense attention from art historians, art critics, art educators, and 
philosophers of art throughout history. Herbert Read pins it down best: 
To be precise: I believe that among the agents or 
instruments of human evolution, art is supremely 
important. I believe the aesthetic [ he is using aesthetic 
as traditionally defined ] has been the means of man 
first acquiring, and then refining consciousness. Form,  
the progressive organization of elements otherwise 
chaotic, is given in perception. It is present in all 
skills-skill is the instinct for form revealed in action. 
Beyond this physiological and instinctive level, any 
further progress in human evolution has always been 
dependent on a realization of formal values (l 957:IX-X). 
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And formal values are those which characterize most works of art which are 
plastic. This thesis addresses, to use Read's words, "the physiological and 
instinctive level" versus "a realization of formal values." However, I break 
with Read when he continues with a preceding discussion in the "Preface" of 
The Philosophy of Modern Art. Read says, "aesthetic activity is biological in 
its nature and function . . .  " But he continues with a belief that such a function 
differentiates human evolution from animal evolution; and I disagree emphatically 
with this belief. This "aesthetic faculty" to which Read refers as only human 
appears to be a typical response by one who takes the arrogant position that 
"man is the measure." I am firm in this disagreement. I do not view man as the 
only living creature with a capacity to be aesthetic as Read defines aesthetic. 
It had been assumed by most biologists that insects did not feel pain upon 
injury-however, it is now known that insects do in fact feel pain. And it is 
known that pain and pleasure are a physiological polar. Now all one has to do 
is step on a cat's tail to hear it painfully scream; or stroke its head gently to 
hear it purr with pleasure. As classical aesthetics has it, "aesthetic experience" 
cannot occur without feelings of pleasure. (I use the terms pain and pleasure as 
interrelated and interdependent for one cannot spring forth in feeling without 
the other potentially present.) Now as "man the measure" would have it, the 
cat would be instinctively responding to danger or reward. Danger, yes-Reward, 
no. 
The innate aesthetic sense and the acquired aesthetic sense are capacities 
characteristic of all living things bound to perception for survival-it is now 
known that plants emit sound. However, the point to be made here is what 
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modern man makes of these lower-order perceptual capacities when he believes 
they rightfully differentiate him from animal. And this would require another 
thesis beyond the scope of this thesis. I do not hold that such a capacity for 
the aesthetic in the classical sense belongs to only man. I do hold that the 
purring cat is experiencing its own kind of lower-order aesthetic response to 
pleasurable experience. 
Man has been determined since the beginning of civilization to make 
something of himself "supernatural." He does so most often by "lording" himself 
over other creatures. In 1 8 5 9  Darwin put man where he rightfully belongs: with 
other animals. Ninety-three years have passed between Darwin's ( 1 8 59)  The Origin 
of Species and Herbert Read's ( 1 9 5 2) The Philosphy of Modern Art. And an even 
greater time has passed since 1 8 59  and 1 984 :  one hundred and twenty-five years 
have passed. Perhaps, Carl Jung provides an adequate answer to man's lack of 
accepting his Darwinian position. Jung gives an interesting explanation as to 
why freedom is one of the more difficult things to accomplish. Jung attributes 
such a problem to the avoidance of psychic injury. Jung believes that the 
unconscious is capable of self-regulation. But he also believes this is a most 
difficult task ( 1 9 8 2 : 1 1 5).  He says, "there are all too many who, on account of 
their notorious ineptitude, thrive better in a rationalistic system than in 
freedom ... freedom is one of the more difficult things" ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 5).  
He uses Goethe's Faust in example: "Those who can stomach this way 
out can say with Faust . . .  "(1 9 8 1 :1 1 5):  
This earthly circle I know well enough. 
Towards the Beyond the view has been cut off; 
Fool-who directs that way his dazzled eye, 
Contrives himself a double in the sky! 
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Let him look round hi m here, not stray beyond; 
To a sound man this world must needs respond. 
To roam into eternity is vain! 
What he perceives, he can attain. 
Thus let him walk along his earthlong day; 
Though phantoms haunt him, let him go his way 
( 1 9 5 1 : 2 8 3).  
Such an answer to the problem would be ideal however, as Jung points out, the 
unconscious remains active; it cannot be emptied ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 6).  Jung continues 
with Faust, "One may for a while play with this delusion, but the day comes 
when one is forced to say with Faust . . .  " ( 1 9 8 1 :1 1 6): 
But now such spectredom so throungs the air 
That none knows how to dodge it, none knows where. 
Though one day greet us with a rational gleam, 
The night entangles us in webs of dream. 
We come back happy from the fields of spring­
And a bird croaks. Croaks what? Some evil thing. 
Enmeshed in superstition night and morn, 
It forms and shows itself and comes to warn. 
And we, so scared, stand without or friend or kin, 
And the door creaks-and nobody comes in 
( 1 9 5 1 : 2 8 1 ). 
According to Jung, man's free will is not great enough to make empty the 
unconscious of its power. Jung believes that deception on this point is the best 
man can do ( 1 9 8 1 :1 1 6 ). He continues with Goethe: 
Unheard by the outward ear 
In the heart I whisper fear; 
Changing shape from hour to hour 
I employ my savage power ( 1 9 5 1 : 2 8 2) .  
Jung tells us  that only one thing is  effective against the power of the unconscious: 
"hard outer necessity." Otherwise, Jung says, "Only what is really oneself has 
the power to heal" ( 1 9 8 1 :1 1 7).  He tells us, "This is why Mephisto offers Faust, 
who is sick of the 'madness of magic, '  the following advice . . .  " (1 98 1 : 1 1 7): 
Right. There is one way that needs 
No money, no physician, and no witch. 
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Pack up your things and get back to the land 
And there begin to dig and ditch; 
Keep to the narrow round, confine your mind, 
And live on fodder of the simplest kind, 
A beast among the beasts; and don't forget 
To use your own dung on the crops you set! 
( 1 9 5 1 :67) .  
Jung's discussion centers on the idea that truth of the self, of who man is, 
will be forced to consciousness by the powerful unconscious, however it oftentimes 
will come about by necessity. We will on occasion receive a glimpse of who we 
really are and if it is viewed as potentially damaging to our psyche, it will be 
repressed or rationalized as "nonsense." However, as Jung tells us, there may 
occur on occasion necessity to acceptance. Jung continues: 
It is a well-known fact that the "simple life" cannot 
be faked, and therefore the unproblematical existence 
of a poor man, who really is delivered over to fate, cannot 
be bought by such cheap imitations. Only the man who 
lives such a life not as a mere possibility, but is actually 
driven to it by the necessity of his own nature, will 
blindly pass over the problem of his soul, since he lacks 
the capacity to grasp it. But once he has seen the 
Faustian problem, the escape into the "simple life" is 
closed for ever. There is of course nothing to stop him 
from taking a two-room cottage in the country, or from 
pottering about in a garden and eating raw turnips. But 
his soul laughs at the deception. Only what is really 
oneself has the power to heal ( 1 9 8 1 :1 1 7).  
If one has difficulty with accepting the "aesthetic experience" had by a purring 
cat and views it as nonsense, then most certainly one would have a most 
difficult time viewing one's self as a Darwinian animal. Jung concludes: 
The regressive restoration of the persona is a possible 
course only for the man who owes the critical failure of 
his life to his own inflatedness. With diminished personality, 
he turns back to the measure he can still fill. But in every 
other case resignation and self-belittlement are an evasion . . .  
( 1 9 8 1 :1 1 7). 
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But he shall have to accept himself as Darwin found him to be, or he shall 
destroy himself in ignorance and illusion: Man has not been the "measure" for 
some 1 2 5 years. For that matter, he has never been the "measure" except in 
the illusion and comfort of his own phantom universe. 
Art rather than science has more greatly influenced the making of these 
myths of his phantom universe. Art continues to twist perception into braided 
mythologies of multi-dimensional-Utopian shapes and dreams in answer to a 
silent universe. Goethe reminds us, "Enmeshed in superstition night and 
morn ...  It forms and shows itself and comes to warn . . .  " The truth of man's 
Utopian dreams, of his phantom universe, and of his arrogance will by the power 
of the unconscious be revealed. As Jung tells us, it will be revealed by necessity 
to consciousness. However, it may never be fully revealed or for long; man has 
also the powers of avoidance. 
If ever there was a "human element" separating man from animal, it has 
been man's belief in myths. Plato perhaps more so than any other philosopher 
struggled to bring about consummation to the idea of ideal forms. He wished 
for a single science, "the science of beauty everywhere" ( 1 9 7  3 :3  54). Newton 
and Einstein desired an ordered universe. Their sciences were based on this 
desire. No sane man would truly desire that his universe or his mind blow 
"willy nilly in the wind." 
I chose Thoreau as an example of one who uses the mind to bring about a 
delicate balance between truth and fact. I could have just as easily used Goethe 
or Wordsworth or Milton. What I could not do successfully was use numerous 
artists from the plastic arts. I chose Michelangelo as the one example, for I 
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believe that he accepted the genius of his skill and presented to us in poetry the 
genius of his soul. As one from the plastic arts who brought about aesthetic 
experience, I see none greater than Michelangelo, even though on completion 
of the fresco paintings in 1 5 1 2 ,  he said, "ne io pittore-1 am no painter" (Bertram, 
1 964:36). He did accept the genius of his skill and I see this as the utmost in 
importance in understanding the nature of Michelangelo's creative and poetic 
intelligence. 
Michelangelo, Darwin, and Thoreau are excellent examples of those who 
sought for the expansion of mind-Thoreau more so than the others. Eiseley 
tells us of Thoreau: "He wanted desperately to know to what degree the human 
mind is capable of inward expansion" ( 1 969 :1 4 3). And this I believe is the issue: 
general intelligence, imaginative-intelligence, creative-intelligence, poetic-intelli-
gence, and all the workings of this intelligence faculty has to be operant for 
inward expansion and perceptual consummation to end in aesthetic experience. 
The conclusions may in this paper appear unkind to the arts but they need 
not be taken in this way. I have stated that art activity in its most primordial 
and elemental state is precusory to the activity of science in its most primordial 
and elemental state. Art activity is the beginnings of perceptual order for it 
is the outcome of the workings of the innate aesthetic sense, which makes 
lower-order perception complete. It is the beginnings of perceptual-making. 
However, I do conclude that in the mind of primitive man such a division between 
the activities of art and science did not exist. Jung supports this conclusion: 
Art by its very nature is not science and science by 
its very nature is not art; both these spheres of the mind 
have something in reserve that is peculiar to them and 
-7 2-
can be explained only in its own terms. Hence when 
we speak of the relation of psychology to art, we 
shall treat only of that aspect of art which can be 
submitted to psychological scrutiny without violating 
its nature. Whatever the psychologist has to say 
about art will be confined to the process of artistic 
creation and has nothing to do with its innermost 
essence. Indeed, art and science would not exist 
as separate entities at all if the fundamental difference 
between them had not long since forced itself on the 
mind. The fact that artistic, scientific, and religious 
propensities still slumber peacefully together in the 
small child, or that with primitives the beginnings 
of art, science, and religion coalesce in the undiff er­
entiated chaos of the magical mentality, or that no 
trace of "mind" can be found in the natural instincts 
of animals-all this which alone would justify a reduction 
of the one to the other. For if we go so far back into 
history of the mind that the distinctions between its 
various fields of activity become altogether invisible, 
we do not reach an underlying principle of their unity, 
but merely an earlier, undifferentiated state in which 
no separate activities yet exist ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 0 3).  
However, and this is  important, Jung continues with the preceding 
exposition by saying: "But the elementary state is not an explanatory principle 
that would allow us to draw conclusions as to the nature of later, more highly 
developed states even though they must necessarily derive from it" ( 1 9 8 1  :3 03).  
Jung makes this statement because he believes that the scientific attitude 
will tend "to overlook the peculiar nature of these more differentiated states 
in favour of their causal derivation . . .  " ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 9 3). In otherwords, as Jung sees 
it, science will continue to search for one right answer to psychological 
phenomena by the means of � and effect and "will endeavor to subordinate 
them to a general but more elementary principle" ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 0 3). However, I need 
to point out in explanation the gist of Jung's terminology: 
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Jung is telling his reader that artistic creation can be evaluated by 
psychologists if creative processes are being investigated; however, as to � 
art is in terms of "aesthetics" must be answered by those whose concern is 
aesthetics ( 1 9 8 1  : 3 0 2).  Jung is using the term "aesthetics" in its traditional 
sense as the investigation of beauty. Nevertheless, Jung is on the right track 
by pointing out that in a primordial and elemental sense the division between 
the activities of art and science are undifferentiated. However, for the purposes 
of this thesis, I have given the activities of art and science in their most primordial 
and elemental states an interdependency with art precusory to science. I believe 
that Jung ( 1 92 2) gives a good discussion in his "Relation of Analytical Psychology 
to Poetry," for he had to rely on information about art and creative processes 
which were limited. 
During Jung's time of writing the "Relation of Analytical Psychology to 
Poetry," it was very much in acceptance that creative processes were functions 
of the unconscious, which was held by Freud to be a kind of "Pandora's Box" 
which contained the roots of neurosis and psychosis. It was very popular at this 
time to see the artist as driven by a kind of "divine frenzy."  As Jung puts it: 
"The divine frenzy of the artist comes perilously close to a pathological state, 
though the two things are not identical" ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 1 7).  Now I certainly do not want 
to confuse Jungian psychology with my thesis, but I do want to give credit to 
his kind insights into the workings of the unconscious and creative processes. 
Jung in many ways was indeed very perceptive, however his time was a very 
trying time for psychology. Freud dominated the field of psychology, and the 
unconscious was viewed as the source of creative processes and "things that go 
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bump in the night." Both of which were viewed as a part of making art. 
Nevertheless , it must be understood that these erroneous beliefs and myths 
about artistic creation still exist today. 
I do want to mention that I believe that Jung twisted somewhat his use 
of Goethe's Faust to meet his needs in discussion; however, I do believe his 
intent was pure. The truth of perception will push its way into consciousness 
or dream but it will do so because the unconscious workings of the mind are in 
a constant state of perceptual ordering and reordering of data to better an 
organism's chance to survive its environmental ongoings with success. If it 
cannot order the perceptual workings of its mind w ith success, it is because it 
is "biologically imperfect." If it acts in a state of continued perceptual confusion, 
it is because it is suffering from illness. If it were in such a state of mental 
confusion in certain hostile environments, it would not continue to survive. 
Viewed in this light, the necessity of fully operating perceptual capacities 
becomes the concern of a species if the species intends to survive. 
From amongst Darwin's "most exhalted animal-man," the most "fit" must 
act as "Scare-Catchers." "Scare-Catchers" net "scary-things." They are those 
who can with courage shatter elusive beliefs of which a phantom universe is 
made. It must be their task to net such beliefs and carefully reformulate them 
to reflect reality more nearly complete. Darwin, Thoreau, and Michelangelo 
"netted scary-things" and brought them to new orders for all of mankind. 
Old beliefs of their phantom universe began to dissolve into more fitting 
ways to lead to new insights and discoveries. Darwin was "buried in facts" 
which he so diligently worked to organize; he says: 
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It was evident that such facts as these, as well as 
many others, could only be explained on the supposition 
that species gradually become modified; and the subject 
haunted me . . .  and I can remember the very spot in the 
road, whilst in my carriage, when to my joy the solution 
occurred to me.. .  however, all nature is perverse and 
will not do as I wish it; and just at present I wish I had 
my old barnacles to work at, and nothing new ( 1 9 5 8:42-43,  
1 9 0-1 9 1) .  
None was without labor to insight and discovery. 
The breaking down of myths is trying but necessary. It always begins 
with an awesome ordering of "scattered-perceptions." Perceptual consummation 
is the most elusive of all that man experiences of his phantom universe. Darwin 
speaks of such elusiveness when he tells us of the difficulties he experienced w ith 
the coming about of The Origin of Species: 
Looking back, I think it was more difficult to see what 
the problems were, than to solve them, so far as I have 
succeeded in doing, and this seems to me rather curious. 
Well, good or bad, my work, thank God, is over, and hard 
work, I can assure you, I have had, and much work which 
has never borne fruit ( 1 9 5 8 : 2 1 6) .  
However, when perceptual consummation is reached-made elegant-"has borne 
fruit-," it is the most profound of all experiences known to man: it is the 
experience of the aesthetic. 
Rollo May ( 1 9 8 2 )  in Man's Search for Meaning refers to a kind of "creative 
self-consciousness."  He expresses the coming about of meaning which comes 
from this consciousness: 
The creative self-consciousness is a stage that most 
of us achieve only at rare intervals; and none of us, 
except the saints, religious or secular, and the great 
creative figures, live very much of our lives on this 
level. But it is the level which gives meaning to our 
actions and experiences on the lesser levels (1 9 8 2 : 1 41 ) .  
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May continues and refers to a kind of "anxiety" which accompanies the bringing 
about of meaning. Anxiety is experienced, according to M ay, as profound when 
man is faced with the powers of Nature: 
It takes a strong self-that is, a strong sense of personal 
identity-to relate fully to nature without being swallowed 
up. For really to feel the silence and the inorganic character 
of nature carries a considerable threat. If one stands on a 
rocky promontory, for example, and looks at the sea in its 
tremendous rising and falling of swells, and if one is fully 
and realistically aware that the sea never "has a tear for 
others' woes nor cares what any other thinks," that one's 
life could be swallowed up with an infinitesimal difference 
being made to the tremendous, ongoing, chemical movement 
of creation, one is threatened . . .  This is the profound threat 
of nothingness," or "nonbeing," which one experiences when 
he fully confronts his relation with inorganic being ( 1 9 8 2 : 7 3-74). 
There may come from some such as Darwin and Thoreau a spirit which allows 
for glorious reactions to awesome and complex workings of Nature's powers but 
Nature "haunts" even them. Nevertheless, it is a phantom universe which comforts 
and protects all men including Darwin and Thoreau. However, it will be men like 
Darwin and Thoreau who will be "Scare-Catchers" and who will bring about an 
end to phantom-universe-mythologies and the universe will then appear less 
scary and more profoundly aesthetic as we will "reap from what they sow." 
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